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S A N D R A  G .  M A Y S O N  
Bias In, Bias Out 
abstract.  Police, prosecutors, judges, and other criminal justice actors increasingly use al-
gorithmic risk assessment to estimate the likelihood that a person will commit future crime. As 
many scholars have noted, these algorithms tend to have disparate racial impacts. In response, 
critics advocate three strategies of resistance: (1) the exclusion of input factors that correlate closely 
with race; (2) adjustments to algorithmic design to equalize predictions across racial lines; and (3) 
rejection of algorithmic methods altogether. 
 This Article’s central claim is that these strategies are at best superﬁcial and at worst counter-
productive because the source of racial inequality in risk assessment lies neither in the input data, 
nor in a particular algorithm, nor in algorithmic methodology per se. The deep problem is the 
nature of prediction itself. All prediction looks to the past to make guesses about future events. In 
a racially stratiﬁed world, any method of prediction will project the inequalities of the past into the 
future. This is as true of the subjective prediction that has long pervaded criminal justice as it is of 
the algorithmic tools now replacing it. Algorithmic risk assessment has revealed the inequality 
inherent in all prediction, forcing us to confront a problem much larger than the challenges of a 
new technology. Algorithms, in short, shed new light on an old problem. 
 Ultimately, the Article contends, redressing racial disparity in prediction will require more 
fundamental changes in the way the criminal justice system conceives of and responds to risk. The 
Article argues that criminal law and policy should, ﬁrst, more clearly delineate the risks that matter 
and, second, acknowledge that some kinds of risk may be beyond our ability to measure without 
racial distortion—in which case they cannot justify state coercion. Further, to the extent that we 
can reliably assess risk, criminal system actors should strive whenever possible to respond to risk 
with support rather than restraint. Counterintuitively, algorithmic risk assessment could be a val-
uable tool in a system that supports the risky. 
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introduction 
“There’s software used across the country to predict future criminals. And 
it’s biased against blacks.”
1
 So proclaimed an exposé by the news outlet ProPub-
lica in the summer of 2016. The story focused on a particular algorithmic tool, 
COMPAS,
2
 but its ambition and effect was to stir alarm about the ascendance of 
algorithmic crime prediction overall. 
The ProPublica story, Machine Bias, was emblematic of broader trends. The 
age of algorithms is upon us. Automated prediction programs now make deci-
sions that affect every aspect of our lives. Soon such programs will drive our cars, 
but for now they shape advertising, credit lending, hiring, policing—just about 
any governmental or commercial activity that has some predictive component. 
There is reason for this shift. Algorithmic prediction is profoundly more effi-
cient, and often more accurate, than is human judgment. It eliminates the irra-
tional biases that skew so much of our decision-making. But it has become abun-
dantly clear that machines too can discriminate.
3
 Algorithmic prediction has the 
potential to perpetuate or amplify social inequality, all while maintaining the ve-
neer of high-tech objectivity. 
Nowhere is the concern with algorithmic bias more acute than in criminal 
justice. Over the last ﬁve years, criminal justice risk assessment has spread rap-
idly. In this context, “risk assessment” is shorthand for the actuarial measure-
ment of some deﬁned risk, usually the risk that the person assessed will commit 
future crime.
4
 The concern with future crime is not new; police, prosecutors, 
judges, probation officers, and parole officers have long been tasked with making 
subjective determinations of dangerousness. The recent shift is from subjective 
 
1. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org
/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/4G83 
-MDAS]. 
2. An acronym for Correctional Offender Management Proﬁling for Alternative Sanctions. Id. 
3. See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, PO-
LICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2017); SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW 
SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUC-
TION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016); Solon Bar-
ocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016) (discuss-
ing the role of bias in data and what can be done about it); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact 
in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017) (proposing that police should make “algorith-
mic impact statements” to assess the potential discriminatory impact of predictive policing 
technologies). 
4. Most risk-assessment tools, however, do not actually measure the likelihood of future crime 
commission but instead measure the likelihood of future arrest, which is a poor proxy. See infra 
Section II.B. 
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to actuarial assessment.
5
 With the rise of big data and bipartisan ambitions to be 
smart on crime, algorithmic risk assessment has taken the criminal justice system 
by storm. It is the linchpin of the bail-reform movement;
6
 the cutting edge of 
policing;
7
 and increasingly used in charging,
8
 sentencing,
9
 and allocating super-
vision resources.
10
 
This development has sparked profound concern about the racial impact of 
risk assessment.
11
 Given that algorithmic crime prediction tends to rely on fac-
tors heavily correlated with race, it appears poised to entrench the inexcusable 
racial disparity so characteristic of our justice system, and to dignify the cultural 
trope of black criminality with the gloss of science.
12
 
 
5. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 61 n.1 (2017) (not-
ing that “[p]redictive technologies are spreading through the criminal justice system like 
wildﬁre” and citing scholarship cataloging the spread). This is not to say that actuarial risk 
assessment is entirely new to criminal justice. Parole boards have used risk-assessment instru-
ments since the 1930s, and some jurisdictions have relied on algorithms for predicting certain 
kinds of offenses, like sex offenses, for decades past. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST 
PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 7-18 (2007). 
6. See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 490 (2018) (“Bail reform 
is gaining momentum nationwide.”); Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 
103 MINN. L. REV. 303 (2018) (studying the use of pretrial risk assessment as a mandatory 
component of bail decisions in Kentucky); Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with For-
mula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us 
/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-science.html [https://perma.cc/Y86J-GHU4] (high-
lighting growing support for algorithmic risk assessments in bail decision-making). 
7. See, e.g., Selbst, supra note 3, at 113 (“[P]redictive policing [is] a popular and growing method 
for police departments to prevent or solve crimes.”); Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, 
Dir., Office of Policy & Legislation, to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2 
(July 29, 2014) [hereinafter DOJ Letter to U.S.S.C.] (“Predictive Policing—the use of algo-
rithms that combine historical and up-to-the-minute crime information to do the work of 
hundreds of traditional crime analysts and produce real-time targeted patrol areas—is spread-
ing.”). 
8. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Prosecution, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 
705-08 (2016) (explaining “predictive prosecution” and exploring its “promise and perils”). 
9. See, e.g., Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57 (2018) (critically assessing the rise of 
actuarial sentencing); Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Po-
licing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 583 (2018) (proposing principles for how risk-assessment tools 
should be used, particularly in the sentencing context). 
10. Issue Brief: Risk/Needs Assessment 101: Science Reveals New Tools to Manage Offenders, PEW CTR. 
ON STATES 2 (Sept. 2011), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedﬁles/pcs
_assets/2011/pewriskassessmentbriefpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/38CG-D395] (describing the 
use of risk assessment to allocate supervision resources). 
11. See infra Section I.A. 
12. Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 237, 237 (2015). 
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Thankfully, we have reached a moment in which the prospect of exacerbating 
racial disparity in criminal justice is widely understood to be unacceptable. And 
so, in this context as elsewhere, the prospect of algorithmic discrimination has 
generated calls for interventions in the predictive process to ensure racial equity. 
Yet this raises the difficult question of what racial equity looks like. The challenge 
is that there are many possible metrics of racial equity in statistical prediction, 
and some of them are mutually exclusive.
13
 The law provides no useful guidance 
about which to prioritize.
14
 In the void, data scientists are exploring different 
statistical measures of equality and different technical methods to achieve 
them.
15
 Legal scholars have also begun to weigh in.
16
 Outside the ivory tower, 
this debate is happening in courts,
17
 city-council chambers,
18
 and community 
meetings.
19
 The stakes are real. Criminal justice institutions must decide 
whether to adopt risk-assessment tools and, if so, what measure of equality to 
demand that those tools fulﬁll. They are making these decisions even as this Ar-
ticle goes to print.
20
 
 
13. See infra Section I.B. 
14. Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1053, 1083-1102 
(2019) (explaining why constitutional law “provides no creditable guidance” for pursuing ra-
cial equity in risk assessment). 
15. See infra Section I.C. 
16. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 14, at 1123-33. 
17. E.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016) (ﬁnding the use of risk assessment at sen-
tencing constitutionally permissible). 
18. E.g., Interim Report - Fall 2016: A Shift from Re-Entry to Pre-Entry, PHILA. CITY COUNCIL SPE-
CIAL COMMITTEE ON CRIM. JUST. REFORM 12 (Fall 2016), http://phlcouncil.com/wp-content
/uploads/2016/11/SCFall2016InterimReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5HX-D9PY] (“Dur-
ing prior public hearings, members of the Special Committee raised concerns that the data 
used in a risk assessment tool’s calculations may be inherently biased, because of the decades 
of disparate impact and racial imbalance within the criminal justice system.”). 
19. E.g., Chris Palmer & Claudia Irizarry-Aponte, Dozens of Speakers at Hearing Assail Pa. Plan to 
Use Algorithm in Sentencing, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 6, 2018), https://www.philly.com/philly
/news/crime/philadelphia-pennsylvania-algorithm-sentencing-public-hearing-20180606
.html [https://perma.cc/P7R4-C8R2]. 
20. The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, for instance, held ﬁve public hearings on its 
proposed risk assessment tool in December 2018 at which it encountered considerable oppo-
sition. To the author’s knowledge, the Commission has not yet determined how to proceed as 
this Article goes to press. See Proposed Sentence Risk Assessment Instrument, PA. COMMISSION ON 
SENT’G, http://pcs.la.psu.edu/guidelines/proposed-risk-assessment-instrument [https://
perma.cc/CB9Y-TZ6Y] (providing link to testimony received at public hearings); Risk Assess-
ment, PA. COMMISSION ON SENT’G, https://www.hominid.psu.edu/specialty_programs/pacs
/publications-and-research/risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/65PV-T74T] (collecting in-
formation relating to the Commission’s project to develop a risk-assessment tool with public 
input). 
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Among racial-justice advocates engaged in the debate, a few common themes 
have emerged.
21
 The ﬁrst is a demand that race, and factors that correlate heavily 
with race, be excluded as input variables for prediction. The second is a call for 
“algorithmic affirmative action” to equalize adverse predictions across racial 
lines. To the extent that scholars have grappled with the necessity of prioritizing 
a particular equality measure, they have mostly urged stakeholders to demand 
equality in the false-positive and false-negative rates for each racial group, or in 
the overall rate of adverse predictions across groups (“statistical parity”). Lastly, 
critics argue that, if algorithmic risk assessment cannot be made meaningfully 
race neutral, the criminal justice system must reject algorithmic methods alto-
gether.
22
 
This Article contends that these three strategies—colorblindness, efforts to 
equalize predictive outputs by race, and the rejection of algorithmic methods—
are at best inadequate, and at worst counterproductive, because they ignore the 
real source of the problem: the nature of prediction itself. All prediction func-
tions like a mirror. Its premise is that we can learn from the past because, absent 
intervention, the future will repeat it. Individual traits that correlated with crime 
commission in the past will correlate with crime commission in future. Predictive 
analysis, in effect, holds a mirror to the past. It distills patterns in past data and 
interprets them as projections of the future. Algorithmic prediction produces a 
precise reﬂection of digital data. Subjective prediction produces a cloudy reﬂec-
tion of anecdotal data. But the nature of the analysis is the same. To predict the 
future under status quo conditions is simply to project history forward. 
Given the nature of prediction, a racially unequal past will necessarily pro-
duce racially unequal outputs. To adapt a computer-science idiom, “bias in, bias 
out.”
23
 To be more speciﬁc, if the thing that we undertake to predict—say ar-
rest—happened more frequently to black people than to white people in the past 
data, then a predictive analysis will project it to happen more frequently to black 
people than to white people in the future. The predicted event, called the target 
variable, is thus the key to racial disparity in prediction. 
The strategies for racial equity that currently dominate the conversation 
amount to distorting the predictive mirror or tossing it out. Consider input data. 
If the thing we have undertaken to predict happens more frequently to people of 
color, an accurate algorithm will predict it more frequently for people of color. 
 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. Aziz Huq offers a more nuanced set of prescriptions, but his analysis is addressed to equity in 
the allocation of coercion rather than equity in the assessment of risk per se. Huq, supra note 
14, at 1111-12. His prescriptions and mine might be read as complementary. See infra note 274 
and accompanying text. 
23. The computer-science idiom is “garbage in, garbage out,” which refers to the fact that algo-
rithmic prediction is only as good as the data on which the algorithm is trained. 
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Limiting input data cannot eliminate the disparity without compromising the 
predictive tool. The same is true of algorithmic affirmative action to equalize 
outputs. Some calls for such interventions are motivated by the well-founded 
belief that, because of racially disparate law enforcement patterns, arrest rates are 
racially distorted relative to offending rates for any given category of crime. But 
unless we know actual offending rates (which we generally do not), reconﬁgur-
ing the data or algorithm to reﬂect a statistical scenario we prefer merely distorts 
the predictive mirror, so that it reﬂects neither the data nor any demonstrable 
reality. Along similar lines, calls to equalize adverse predictions across racial lines 
require an algorithm that forsakes the statistical risk assessment of individuals 
in favor of risk sorting within racial groups. And wholesale rejection of algorith-
mic methods rejects the predictive mirror directly. 
This Article’s normative claim is that neither distorting the predictive mirror 
nor tossing it out is the right path forward. If the image in the predictive mirror 
is jarring, bending it to our liking does not solve the problem. Nor does rejecting 
algorithmic methods, because there is every reason to expect that subjective pre-
diction entails an equal degree of racial inequality. To reject algorithms in favor 
of judicial risk assessment is to discard the precise mirror for the cloudy one. It 
does not eliminate disparity; it merely turns a blind eye. 
Actuarial risk assessment, in other words, has revealed the racial inequality 
inherent in all crime prediction in a racially unequal world, forcing us to confront 
a much deeper problem than the dangers of a new technology. In making the 
mechanics of prediction transparent, algorithmic methods have exposed the dis-
parities endemic to all criminal justice risk assessment, subjective and actuarial 
alike. Tweaking an algorithm or its input data, or even rejecting actuarial meth-
ods, will not redress the racial disparities in crime or arrest risk in a racially strat-
iﬁed world. 
The inequality exposed by algorithmic risk assessment should instead galva-
nize a more fundamental rethinking of the way in which the criminal justice sys-
tem understands and responds to risk.
24
 To start, we should be more thoughtful 
about what we want to learn from the past, and more honest about what we can 
learn from it. If the risk that really matters is the risk of serious crime, but we 
have no access to data that fairly represent the incidence of it, then there is no 
basis for predicting serious crime at all. Nor is it acceptable to resort to predicting 
some other event, like “any arrest,” that happens to be easier to measure. This 
lesson has profound implications for all forms of criminal justice risk assessment, 
both actuarial and subjective. 
If the data fairly represent the incidence of serious crime, however, the place 
to redress racial disparity is not in the measurement of risk, but in the response to 
 
24. See infra Part IV. 
the yale law journal 128:2218  2019 
2226 
it. Risk assessment must reﬂect the past; it need not dictate the future. The de-
fault response to risk could be supportive rather than coercive. In the long term, 
a supportive response to risk would help to redress the conditions that produce 
risk in the ﬁrst place. In the short term, it would mitigate the disparate racial 
impact of prediction. Counterintuitively, algorithmic assessment could play a 
valuable role in a system that targets the risky for support rather than for re-
straint. 
This Article makes three core contributions. The ﬁrst is explanatory. Thus 
far, the computer-science and statistical literature on algorithmic fairness and the 
legal literature on criminal justice risk assessment have largely evolved on sepa-
rate tracks.
25
 The Article offers an accessible taxonomy of potential measures of 
equality in prediction, synthesizing recent work in computer science with legal-
equality constructs. The second contribution is a descriptive analysis of practical 
and conceptual problems with strategies to redress predictive inequality that are 
aimed at algorithmic methods per se, given that all prediction replicates the past. 
The Article’s third contribution is the normative argument that meaningful 
change will require a more fundamental rethinking of the role of risk in criminal 
justice. 
Although this Article is about criminal justice risk assessment, it also offers a 
window onto the broader conversation about algorithmic fairness, which is itself 
a microcosm of perennial debates about the nature of equality. Through a fo-
cused case study, the Article aims to contribute to the larger literatures on algo-
rithmic fairness and on competing conceptions of equality in law. The Article’s 
Conclusion draws out some of these larger connections. 
A few caveats are in order. First, the Article focuses on racial disparity in pre-
diction, severed from the messy realities of implementation. Megan Stevenson 
has shown that the vagaries of implementation may affect the treatment of jus-
tice-involved people more than a risk-assessment algorithm itself.
26
 Still, risk-
assessment tools are meant to guide decision-making. To the extent they do, dis-
parities in classiﬁcation will translate into disparities in outcomes. For that rea-
son, and for the purpose of clarity, this Article focuses on disparities in classiﬁ-
cation alone. 
The second caveat is that this Article speaks of race in the crass terminology 
of “black” and “white.” This language reduces a deeply fraught and complex so-
cial phenomenon to an artiﬁcial binary. The Article uses this language in part by 
necessity, to explain competing metrics of equality with as much clarity as pos-
 
25. A handful of seminal articles, however, have helped to bridge the gap. See generally Barocas & 
Selbst, supra note 3; Huq, supra note 14; Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. 
PA. L. REV. 633 (2017); Selbst, supra note 3. 
26. Stevenson, supra note 6. 
bias in, bias out 
2227 
sible, and in part to recognize that the criminal justice system itself tends to de-
ploy this reductive schema. The reader may judge whether this approach is war-
ranted. 
It is important to note, though, that much of the Article’s analysis generalizes 
to other minority groups. Although the criminal-legal apparatus has inﬂicted 
unique harm on African Americans over the past two hundred years, the data 
that generate predictions may also include disparities with respect to other 
groups, and this data will in turn produce predictive inequality. The manifold 
equality metrics presented in Section I.C apply to any intergroup comparison, as 
do the trade-offs among them. And there is every reason to be concerned about 
predictive disparities for other marginalized populations. Melissa Hamilton has 
recently shown that the very same prediction data set that ProPublica analyzed 
for black/white disparities manifests even greater disparities between Hispanic 
and white defendants.
27
 As the debate on equality in algorithmic prediction 
evolves, the analysis here is meant to serve as a template with broader applica-
tions. 
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I chronicles the recent scholarly and 
public debate over risk assessment and racial inequality, using the ProPublica 
saga and a stylized example to illustrate why race-neutral prediction is impossi-
ble. It concludes with a taxonomy of potential metrics of predictive equality. Part 
II lays out the Article’s central conception of prediction as a mirror. For clarity of 
analysis, it draws an important distinction between two possible sources of racial 
disparity in prediction: racial distortions in past-crime data relative to crime 
rates, and a difference in crime rates by race. Accounting for both, Part III ex-
plains why the prescriptions for racial equity that currently dominate the debate 
will not solve the problem. Part IV argues for a broader rethinking of the role of 
risk in criminal justice. The Conclusion draws out implications for other predic-
tive arenas. 
i .  the impossibility of race neutrality  
A. The Risk-Assessment-and-Race Debate 
Just a few years ago, criminal justice risk assessment was an esoteric topic. 
Today it is fodder for The Daily Show,
28
 of interest to major mainstream media 
 
27. Melissa Hamilton, The Biased Algorithm: Evidence of Disparate Impact on Hispanics, 56 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
28. The Daily Show with Trevor Noah, Disrupting the Legal System with Robots, YOUTUBE (Mar. 
7, 2018), https://youtu.be/VkizYljxcD8. 
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outlets,
29
 and the subject of a vibrant and growing body of scholarship.
30
 That 
literature offers an introduction to risk assessment that need not be repeated 
here. But it is important to deﬁne some key terms. As used in this Article, “crim-
inal justice risk assessment” refers to the actuarial assessment of the likelihood 
of some future event, usually arrest for crime. The term encompasses two kinds 
of risk-assessment tools: the more basic and more prevalent checklist instru-
ments, and the more sophisticated machine-learning algorithms that represent 
the future.
31
 It does not include clinical assessment or instruments used for 
“structured professional judgment” (SPJ).
32
 
As the use of criminal justice risk assessment has spread, concern over its 
potential racial impact has exploded. The watershed year was 2014. A journalist 
asked whether Chicago’s new predictive policing strategy was “racist”;
33
 legal 
 
29. E.g., Angwin et al., supra note 1; Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., Should Prison Sentences Be 
Based on Crimes That Haven’t Been Committed yet?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 4, 2015), https://
ﬁvethirtyeight.com/features/prison-reform-risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/9UP9 
-U86D] (employing simulations to demonstrate risk-assessment outcomes and disparate ra-
cial impact); Dewan, supra note 6. 
30. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 9; Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 
59 (2017); Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231 (2015); Harcourt, supra note 12; Huq, supra note 14; John Logan Koepke 
& David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. 
L. REV. 1725 (2018); Mayson, supra note 6; Anne Milgram et al., Pretrial Risk Assessment: Im-
proving Public Safety and Fairness in Pretrial Decision Making, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 216 (2015); 
John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489 (2016); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671 
(2015); Slobogin, supra note 9; Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientiﬁc Ra-
tionalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014); Stevenson, supra note 6; Deborah 
Hellman, Measures of Algorithmic Fairness (Jan. 25, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle 
with author). 
31. For a brief explanation of the difference, see Mayson, supra note 6, at 509-11, 511 n.97. See also 
Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sentencing Decisions, 
27 FED. SENT’G REP. 222 (2015); Marion Oswald et al., Algorithmic Risk Assessment Policing 
Models: Lessons from the Durham HART model and ‘Experimental’ Proportionality, 27 INFO. & 
COMM. TECH. L. 223 (2018) (describing a machine-learning algorithm); Assessing Offender 
Risk, CTR. FOR SCI. & L., http://scilaw.org/risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/6K9U-DSA9] 
(promoting sophisticated risk-assessment software that operates on hand-held tablets). 
32. See, e.g., Chris Baird, Structured Professional Judgment Models, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DE-
LINQ. (2017), https://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/ﬁles/structured_professional 
_judgment_models.pdf [https://perma.cc/25SZ-QF9K] (explaining structured professional 
judgment (SPJ) and critiquing SPJ instruments used in a criminal justice context). 
33. Matt Stroud, The Minority Report: Chicago’s New Police Computer Predicts Crimes, but Is It Rac-
ist?, VERGE (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:31 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2014/2/19/5419854/the 
-minority-report-this-computer-predicts-crime-but-is-it-racist [https://perma.cc/E6HJ 
-A7QP]. 
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scholar Sonja Starr argued that the U.S. Constitution prohibits the use of race-, 
gender-, or income-correlated variables in risk-assessment tools used at sentenc-
ing;
34
 and the DOJ ﬂagged both “the promise and danger of data analytics in 
sentencing and corrections policy.”
35
 Then-Attorney General Eric Holder 
warned that risk-assessment tools might “exacerbate unwarranted and unjust 
disparities that are already far too common in our criminal justice system and in 
our society.”
36
 The following year, Bernard Harcourt expanded on the prob-
lem.
37
 The nation’s long history of social and economic oppression of African 
Americans—including criminal laws and law enforcement targeting black men—
has produced higher rates of arrest, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration 
among black Americans than white Americans. The result is that criminal history 
now correlates with race.
38
 Any form of risk assessment that relies on criminal 
history will have a disparate impact on black communities, and on black men in 
 
34. Starr, supra note 30. She also noted that the use of such instruments “is likely to further con-
centrate mass incarceration’s racial impact,” because many factors included in the tools “are 
highly correlated with race.” Id. at 838; see also Sonja B. Starr, Sentencing, by the Numbers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/opinion/sentencing-by 
-the-numbers.html [https://perma.cc/FK9B-YLQZ]. 
35. DOJ Letter to U.S.S.C., supra note 7, at 1, 7 (formatting and capitalization altered) (cautioning 
that the use of risk assessment at sentencing “ultimately raises constitutional questions be-
cause of the use of group-based characteristics and suspect classiﬁcations in the analytics”). 
36. Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network Conference (Aug. 1, 
2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-national 
-association-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th [https://perma.cc/D87X-8GU8]. 
37. Harcourt, supra note 12, at 237 (arguing that heavy reliance on criminal-history information 
for purposes of risk assessment “will unquestionably aggravate the already intolerable racial 
imbalance in our prison populations”). 
38. See, e.g., Frank McIntyre & Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Pretrial Detention, 10 J. EM-
PIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 741, 759 (2013) (identifying black defendants’ disproportionate likeli-
hood of being arrested on drug charges as a potential cause of the race gap); Jennifer L. Skeem 
& Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, and Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact, 
54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 683-84, 704-06 (2016) (concluding that criminal history correlates 
with race in their data set). 
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particular.
39
 Media, advocacy organizations, and other scholars echoed the con-
cern.
40
 In 2016, the ProPublica exposé supercharged the debate.
41
 
Many people now focus on the possible racial effects of criminal justice risk 
assessment. Grassroots advocacy groups have launched campaigns to demand 
racial equality as new risk-assessment tools are implemented, including a major 
national campaign urging jurisdictions to reject such tools altogether in the pre-
 
39. Harcourt, supra note 12, at 240 (“[T]he continuously increasing racial disproportionality in 
the prison population necessarily entails that the prediction instruments, focused as they are 
on prior criminality, are going to hit hardest the African American communities.”). 
40. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Inﬂuence of Criminal History on Risk Assess-
ments, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75, 78 (2015) (exploring concerns with the use of criminal his-
tory in risk assessment, including “the potential that criminal history is an unfortunate proxy 
for race and social disadvantage”); Hamilton, supra note 30, at 242 (discussing challenges, 
including constitutional considerations, relating to racial classiﬁcations); Anna Maria Barry-
Jester et al., The New Science of Sentencing: Should Prison Sentencing Be Based on Crimes That 
Haven’t Been Committed Yet?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2015, 7:15 AM), https://www
.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing [https://perma.cc
/J4UW-BDKP]; Barry-Jester et al., supra note 29 (including simulations demonstrating risk-
assessment outcomes and disparate racial impact); Anna Orso, Can Philly’s New Technology 
Predict Recidivism Without Being Racist?, BILLYPENN (Sept. 25, 2017, 9:00 AM), https:// 
billypenn.com/2017/09/25/can-phillys-new-technology-predict-recidivism-without-being 
-racist [https://perma.cc/93S7-G5BH]; Race & Justice News: Risk Assessment or Race Assess-
ment?, SENT’G PROJECT (July 23, 2015), http://www.sentencingproject.org/news/race-justice
-news-risk-assessment-or-race-assessment [https://perma.cc/K3LC-73S6]. 
41. Angwin et al., supra note 1. 
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trial context.
42
 Legal scholars
43
 and policy organizations
44
 are also increasingly 
attentive to the problem, as are computer scientists and econometricians who 
write about criminal justice.
45
 Aziz Huq has laid out both the history of racial 
oppression in criminal justice that makes the concern so acute and the inade-
quacy of current constitutional doctrine to address it.
46
 
Notwithstanding this growing interest, the debate remains hampered by 
ambiguous terms.
47
 For some people, to say that a decision procedure is “biased” 
is to say that it is statistically unsound.
48
 A risk-assessment algorithm is racially 
 
42. In August of 2018, the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights and 115 other ad-
vocacy groups released The Use of Pretrial “Risk Assessment” Instruments: A Shared Statement of 
Civil Rights Concerns, LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf 
/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ83-TKGA] [here-
inafter Use of Pretrial “Risk Assessment” Instruments]. See also, e.g., Predictive Policing, MEDIA 
MOBILIZING PROJECT, https://mediamobilizing.org/predictive-policing [https://perma.cc
/Y3FK-W7JS]. 
43. See, e.g., Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3 REFORMING 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A REPORT OF THE ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN 
SCHOLARSHIP AND REFORM 21, 34-39 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (evaluating the risk of pretrial risk 
assessments and noting accuracy, racial-equality, and procedural concerns); Anupam Chan-
der, The Racist Algorithm, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2017) (arguing that the real-world 
facts on which algorithms used in criminal justice risk assessment are based are “deeply suf-
fused with invidious discrimination”); Eaglin, supra note 30, at 94-99 (discussing how risk 
assessment might “compromise[e] equality”); Mayson, supra note 6, at 494-96; Selbst, supra 
note 3; see also Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
857, 863-64 (2017) (exploring the racial effects of algorithmic prediction in the employment 
context). 
44. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Policy Program, Moving Beyond Money: A Primer on Bail Reform, 
HARV. L. SCH. (Oct. 2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail 
-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/24PK-Z9XP]; Andrea Woods & Portia Allen-Kyle, A New Vi-
sion for Pretrial Justice in the United States, ACLU (Mar. 2019), https://www.aclu.org/sites 
/default/ﬁles/ﬁeld_document/aclu_pretrial_reform_toplines_positions_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PU6E-ZC5D]. 
45. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 6; Jon Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions and Machine Predictions 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23180, 2017), https://www.nber.org 
/papers/w23180.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WHJ-TWLJ]. 
46. Huq, supra note 14. 
47. Cf. Selbst, supra note 3, at 123 (noting that “[t]he words ‘discrimination,’ ‘fairness,’ and ‘bias’ 
evoke a family of related concepts”). 
48. In econometrics, “bias” describes any systematic deviation of a statistical calculation from the 
true value of the thing calculated. See Bruce E. Hansen, Econometrics 105 (Dec. 2018) (un-
published manuscript), https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~bhansen/econometrics 
/Econometrics.pdf [https://perma.cc/QS4D-BEF4] (“An estimator [calculation technique] 
with the property that its expectation [the average of the values it produces over many itera-
tions] equals the parameter it is estimating [true value of the thing it is estimating] is called 
unbiased.”); see also Bias, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com
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biased in this sense if it systematically over- or understates the average risk of 
one racial group relative to another.
49
 Others, however, view a judgment proce-
dure as “biased” if it produces differential effects across racial groups that present 
a moral concern, even if the judgments themselves are not systematically less 
accurate for one group than for the other.
50
 “Discrimination” also carries ambi-
guity; it can mean any “act of making or perceiving a difference,”
51
 or only an 
unjustiﬁed act of making or perceiving a difference.
52
 Along similar lines, al-
though Jennifer Skeem and Christopher Lowenkamp have contested Harcourt’s 
claim that criminal history serves as a “proxy” for race in risk assessment, in fact 
 
/dictionary/bias [https://perma.cc/TF8T-KLFQ] (giving as possible deﬁnitions of the term 
“bias” “deviation of the expected value of a statistical estimate from the quantity it estimates” 
and “systematic error introduced into sampling or testing by selecting or encouraging one 
outcome or answer over others”). 
49. William Dieterich et al., COMPAS Risk Scales: Demonstrating Accuracy Equity and Predictive 
Parity, NORTHPOINTE INC. 1, 2-3, 8-13 (July 8, 2016), http://go.volarisgroup.com/rs/430 
-MBX-989/images/ProPublica_Commentary_Final_070616.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4GM
-RBQY] (suggesting that a predictive instrument is biased only if a given score, or classiﬁca-
tion, means a different likelihood of the predicted outcome for members of one racial group 
than members of the other); see also Anthony W. Flores et al., False Positives, False Negatives, 
and False Analyses: A Rejoinder to “Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to 
Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks.,” 80 FED. PROBATION 38, 40 (2016) 
(arguing that “well-established and accepted standards exist to test for bias in risk assess-
ment”); Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 38, at 685 (asserting that if “a given score [has] the 
same meaning regardless of group membership,” the instrument is “unbiased”). 
50. E.g., Kim, supra note 43, at 866 (“Classiﬁcation bias occurs when employers rely on classiﬁca-
tion schemes, such as data algorithms, to sort or score workers in ways that worsen inequality 
or disadvantage along the lines of race, sex, or other protected characteristics.”). These two 
uses of the word “bias” correspond to the notions of irrational versus rational (or statistical) 
discrimination. Deborah Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?, 29 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 77, 83-86 (2003); Jeffrey S. Morrow, Insuring Fairness: The Popular Creation of 
Genetic Antidiscrimination, 98 GEO. L.J. 215, 230-32 (2009). Frederick Schauer offers a similar 
analysis of the ambiguity of the terms “stereotype” and “prejudice.” FREDERICK SCHAUER, 
PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES 7, 13-17 (2003) (noting that these terms may refer 
to a generalization that is irrelevant or statistically unsound or to a generalization that is both 
relevant and statistically sound but deployed in a morally objectionable way). 
51. Discrimination, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/discrimination [https://perma.cc/7WZH-RRVK]. 
52. Id. (deﬁning “discrimination” as “prejudiced or prejudicial outlook, action, or treatment”); 
see also Anya E.R. Prince, Insurance Risk Classiﬁcation in an Era of Genomics: Is a Rational Dis-
crimination Policy Rational?, 96 NEB. L. REV. 624, 630-34, 641-42 (2018) (discussing “fair” and 
“unfair” discrimination). Note that the term “discrimination” can also be used in a technical 
legal sense, to mean only such differential treatment or impact as would incur liability pursu-
ant to antidiscrimination law. See infra note 63. 
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they just deﬁne “proxy” differently than he does.
53
 These ambiguous terms can 
obscure the questions at stake, which are already complex enough. 
B. The Problem of Equality Trade-offs 
The central complication is that there is no single measure of racial equality 
in risk assessment. Instead, there are many possible measures and, in most cir-
cumstances, it is impossible to achieve racial equality according to every measure 
at once. 
The ProPublica saga illustrates the problem. ProPublica concluded that the 
algorithmic tool COMPAS was “biased against blacks.”
54
 Using data from a 
county where COMPAS was used to assess the likelihood that a pretrial defend-
ant would be rearrested if she or he remained at liberty, the ProPublica research-
ers compared COMPAS’s risk classiﬁcations with defendants’ actual outcomes—
whether each defendant was rearrested or not—over the subsequent two years. 
Northpointe, the company that owns COMPAS, responded with indignation: 
ProPublica’s own data showed that COMPAS was demonstrably race neutral!
55
 
The fascinating thing was that both ProPublica and Northpointe were right; 
they were just emphasizing different metrics of equality.
56
 The fact that led 
Northpointe to claim race neutrality was that black and white defendants classi-
ﬁed as high risk by COMPAS were in fact rearrested at equal rates. A high-risk 
classiﬁcation meant the same chance of rearrest for a black defendant as for a 
 
53. Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 38, at 698-700 (assessing whether criminal history func-
tioned as a proxy for race in the federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment tool (PCRA) and 
concluding that it did not). Skeem and Lowenkamp deﬁne a “proxy” to mean a variable that 
merely stands in for another and has no independent predictive value. Id. at 700. In this sense, 
criminal history is not a proxy for race. Even after subtracting the predictive value of race from 
the predictive value of criminal history, as it were, criminal history retains additional—inde-
pendent—predictive value. Id. (It is unclear from their analysis whether they ﬁnd criminal 
history to function as a mediator or a moderator of race for purposes of the PCRA, but the 
analysis better supports the latter conclusion.) Harcourt calls criminal history a “proxy” for 
race in the more modest sense that it correlates with race (even if it also has independent 
predictive value), such that relying on it will have disparate impact across racial lines. Har-
court, supra note 12, at 238. 
54. Angwin et al., supra note 1. 
55. Dieterich et al., supra note 49, at 1; see also Flores et al., supra note 49, at 41 (reporting the 
results of an independent study of the same data and concluding that COMPAS was equally 
predictive for white and black defendants). 
56. For a detailed analysis of this discourse, see Melissa Hamilton, Debating Algorithmic Fairness 
(unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with author). 
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white one (approximately 60% on the any-arrest-risk scale and 20% on the vio-
lent-arrest-risk scale, over a two-year period).
57
 This metric of equality is some-
times called predictive parity. The fact that led ProPublica to claim racial bias was 
something more subtle: a black defendant who would not be rearrested within 
the study period was much more likely to be classiﬁed as high risk (44.9%) than 
a white defendant who would not be rearrested (23.5%).
58
 In statistical terms, 
the false-positive rate was much higher for the black defendants than the white 
defendants.
59
 Meanwhile, a white defendant who would be rearrested was more 
likely to be deemed low risk (47.7%) than a black defendant who would be rear-
rested (28.0%).
60
 The false-negative rate was much greater for white defendants 
than for black defendants. ProPublica saw these racial differences in COMPAS’s 
error rates as a serious injustice. 
The racial disparity in error rates was not, however, the result of invidious 
distortion in the COMPAS algorithm itself.
61
 It was a mathematical result of the 
divergent rates of arrest between the black and white defendants in the underly-
ing data set. Because the rate of arrest was higher among the black defendants, 
they, on average, had higher arrest-risk proﬁles. When the average risk is higher 
for one group than for another, a greater proportion of the former group will be 
predicted to be rearrested, and a greater proportion of that group will also be 
mistakenly predicted to be rearrested. This is true no matter how carefully de-
signed the algorithm is, so long as the algorithm is also striving to have equal 
predictive accuracy for each racial group. 
To see this aspect of prediction more clearly, consider a stylized hypothetical. 
Figure 1 below depicts two groups of ten arrestees each—gray and black—who 
are subject to risk assessment. Say that the algorithm in question predicts rear-
rest within a year. For clarity, presume that it makes binary decisions: for each 
ﬁgure, it predicts either rearrest or no rearrest. A rearrest prediction is a “posi-
tive.” If it is correct, it is a “true positive,” and if it is incorrect, it is a “false posi-
tive.” A no-rearrest prediction is a “negative.” The ﬁgures depicted in outline 
 
57. Dieterich et al., supra note 49, at 4. If anything, the rate of rearrest was higher for black de-
fendants in each risk category. In other words, the risk classiﬁcations were more “generous” 
to black defendants than to white defendants. See Flores et al., supra note 49, at 41-42; id. at 
43 (“A given COMPAS score translates into roughly the same likelihood of recidivism, 
whether a defendant is Black or White.”). 
58. Angwin et al., supra note 1. 
59. Whether or not the statistical concepts of “false positives” and “false negatives” are applicable 
in the context of risk assessment is debatable and is discussed below. See infra Section III.B.2. 
60. Angwin et al., supra note 1. 
61. There is controversy in the literature over whether the language of “prediction” and “error 
rates” is appropriate to the risk-assessment context. The debate is discussed more fully below. 
See infra Section III.B.2.b. 
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only represent those who will ultimately be rearrested. The solid ﬁgures repre-
sent those who will not be rearrested. Note that the groups have different base 
rates of rearrest: a greater proportion of the gray group will actually be rearrested 
(2/10) than the black group (1/10). The dividing line between the ﬁgures, ﬁnally, 
represents the algorithm. The algorithm predicts rearrest for the ﬁgures to the 
left of the line. The ﬁgures to the right of the line are predicted not to be rear-
rested. 
FIGURE 1. 
GROUPS WITH DIFFERENT BASE RATES OF REARREST; PREDICTIVE PARITY 
 
         Predicted rearrest  Predicted no-rearrest 
 
This algorithm produces forecasts that are equal across the two groups in 
one sense: a positive forecast is equally accurate for each group. For both the 
black and the gray groups, 50% of those forecast for rearrest (the ﬁgures to the 
left of the line) are indeed rearrested (the ﬁgures depicted in outline only). When 
the algorithm is deployed prospectively, a positive prediction for any individual 
will mean a 50% chance of rearrest regardless of whether the person is gray or 
black. This is to say that the algorithm achieves predictive parity, the equality 
metric that Northpointe emphasized. 
In other ways, however, the algorithm produces unequal results. Consider 
the rate of false predictions among those who will not be rearrested—the false-
positive rate. Of the eight gray ﬁgures who will not be rearrested (the solid gray 
ﬁgures), two are mistakenly forecast for rearrest. Of the nine black ﬁgures who 
will not be rearrested (the solid black ﬁgures), only one is mistakenly forecast 
for arrest. The false-positive rate is much higher for the gray group (25%) than 
for the black one (11%). This is the form of inequality that ProPublica discovered 
in the COMPAS data. And as in the ProPublica study, this algorithm produces 
unequal results in another sense as well: twice as many gray ﬁgures as black ones 
are forecast for rearrest. The algorithm has a much greater overall impact on the 
group with the higher base rate. In the terminology favored by data scientists, 
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the tool does not achieve statistical parity. The table below records these three 
metrics. 
TABLE 1. 
GROUPS WITH DIFFERENT BASE RATES OF REARREST; PREDICTIVE PARITY 
 Gray Black  
Percentage of Rearrest  
Forecasts That Are Correct 
50 50 Predictive Parity 
Percentage of No-Rearrests  
Falsely Forecast for Rearrest 
25 11 Disparate False-
Positive Rates 
Percentage of Group Forecast 
for Rearrest 
40 20 No Statistical Parity 
 
It is possible to modify the algorithm to equalize the false-positive rates for 
the two groups, but at a cost. Figure 2 below represents one possible modiﬁca-
tion: predicting arrest for a greater proportion of the black group. For both the 
black and the gray groups, now 25% of the non-rearrestees (the solid ﬁgures) are 
mistakenly forecast for rearrest. That is, the false-positive rate is 25% for each 
group. The total number of people forecast for rearrest is also much closer across 
groups. But notice the effect on the accuracy of the rearrest forecasts themselves 
(depicted by the dividing line between ﬁgures). For the gray group, a prediction 
of rearrest is still 50% likely to be true. But it is only about 30% likely to be true 
for the black group. When the algorithm is deployed prospectively, a rearrest 
forecast will mean something different depending on whether the ﬁgure is gray 
or black. 
FIGURE 2. 
GROUPS WITH DIFFERENT BASE RATES OF REARREST; PARITY IN FALSE-POSITIVE RATES 
 
    Predicted rearrest        Predicted no-rearrest 
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TABLE 2. 
GROUPS WITH DIFFERENT BASE RATES OF REARREST; PARITY IN FALSE-POSITIVE RATES 
 Gray Black  
Percentage of Rearrest  
Forecasts That Are Correct 
50 31 Disparate Predictive 
Accuracy 
Percentage of No-Rearrests 
Falsely Forecast for Rearrest 
25 25 Parity in False- 
Positive Rates 
Percentage of Group Forecast 
for Rearrest 
40 30.3 Closer to Statistical 
Parity 
 
It is simple enough to recover predictive parity by altering the gray group for 
whom rearrest is forecast, as depicted in Figure 3 below. But that will introduce 
a new disparity. Now, among those who are rearrested (the ﬁgures depicted only 
in outline), the algorithm correctly predicts rearrest for 100% of the black ar-
restees, but “misses” 50% of the gray arrestees. There is now a dramatic disparity 
in false-negative rates. 
FIGURE 3. 
GROUPS WITH DIFFERENT BASE RATES OF REARREST; PARITY IN FALSE-POSITIVE RATES AND 
PREDICTIVE PARITY 
 
             Predicted rearrest                Predicted no-rearrest 
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TABLE 3. 
GROUPS WITH DIFFERENT BASE RATES OF REARREST; PARITY IN FALSE-POSITIVE RATES AND 
PREDICTIVE PARITY 
 Gray Black  
Percentage of Rearrest  
Forecasts That Are  
Correct 
33 31 ~ Predictive Parity 
Percentage of  
No-Rearrests Falsely 
Forecast for Rearrest 
25 25 Parity in False- 
Positive Rates 
Percentage of Group 
Forecast for Rearrest 
30 30.3 ~ Statistical Parity 
Percentage of Rearrests 
Missed 
50 0 Disparate False- 
Negative Rates 
 
As this example illustrates, if the base rate of the predicted outcome differs 
across racial groups, it is impossible to achieve (1) predictive parity; (2) parity in 
false-positive rates; and (3) parity in false-negative rates at the same time (unless 
prediction is perfect, which it never is). Computer scientists have provided 
mathematical proofs of this fact.
62
 When base rates differ, we must prioritize one 
of these metrics at the expense of another. Race neutrality is not attainable. 
C. Charting Predictive Equality 
The reality is even more complex than this stylized example because there 
are many additional possible metrics of intergroup equality. This Section brieﬂy 
charts the most important such metrics, synthesizing the recent computer-sci-
 
62. See, e.g., Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in Re-
cidivism Prediction Instruments, 5 BIG DATA 153 (2017); Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-offs 
in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores, LEIBNIZ INT’L PROC. INFORMATICS, Jan. 2017, at 43:1, 
43:4; see also Richard A. Berk et al., Forecasting Domestic Violence: A Machine Learning Approach 
to Help Inform Arraignment Decisions, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 94, 103-04 (2016) (illus-
trating the impossibility using real arraignment data and a machine-learning algorithm that 
forecasts whether a new arrest for a domestic-violence offense will occur within a period of 
twenty-four months); Huq, supra note 14, at 1055, 1123-24 (explaining this “impossibility re-
sult”). 
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ence literature on algorithmic fairness with the familiar legal concepts of dispar-
ate treatment and disparate impact. This taxonomy does not analyze legal liabil-
ity. The goal, rather, is to organize the possible conceptual measures of inter-
group equality in a format accessible to both lawyers and statisticians. Those 
readers who are already immersed in the ﬁeld or who prefer to avoid technical 
detail may wish to skip directly to Part II. 
U.S. law divides racially unequal action into two major frameworks: dispar-
ate treatment and disparate impact.
63
 Neither triggers legal liability if the differ-
ential treatment or impact is adequately justiﬁed, but for purposes of this taxon-
omy we will ignore second-order questions of justiﬁcation. Conceptions of 
equality in risk assessment can be classiﬁed as either disparate treatment or dis-
parate impact metrics. Disparate treatment metrics relate to the algorithmic pro-
cess itself. Disparate impact metrics relate to its outputs.
64
 This division also 
aligns loosely with the distinction between “individual” and “group” equality 
metrics, although that distinction is not a clean one.
65
 
 
63. There are two primary vehicles for asserting discrimination claims: the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Federal Constitution (and analogous state constitutional provisions) and federal 
and state statutes that prohibit discrimination on various grounds, including on the basis of 
race. A discrimination claim pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause must allege and prove 
disparate treatment to succeed; a showing of disparate impact alone will not suffice. Antidis-
crimination statutes also permit disparate treatment claims, and some permit disparate impact 
claims as well. As Richard Primus explains, although there are technical differences in the 
constitutional and statutory disparate treatment frameworks, substantive analysis of a dispar-
ate treatment claim pursuant to either is fundamentally the same. See Richard Primus, The 
Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1354-56 (2010). 
64. To be clear, none of these output measures correspond to disparate impact liability under cur-
rent law. As noted, only the ﬁrst step in a legal disparate impact analysis is about outputs; the 
ultimate question is whether the challenged disparate impact is justiﬁed, a question that is 
arguably just as much about the decision-making process as a disparate treatment analysis. 
See generally Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 
1362 (2017) (arguing that disparate impact and disparate treatment liability are “separated 
superﬁcially by the presence or absence of discriminatory intent but united fundamentally in 
addressing a common injury: status causation”). 
65. Much recent work in algorithmic fairness has categorized measures of equality as either 
“group fairness” or “individual fairness” metrics. This dichotomy, however, can be mislead-
ing. Almost every possible measure of “group fairness” can be phrased using the word “indi-
vidual” (i.e., predictive parity requires that, for any individual, a given risk score communi-
cates the same average risk regardless of race). Conversely, any “individual-fairness” metric 
can be phrased using the word “group” (i.e., a single-threshold rule requires that the group 
of people who present any given degree of risk all receive the same risk score). The difference 
is that “individual-fairness” metrics relate to how the algorithm arrives at its output in each 
individual case, whereas “group-fairness” metrics relate to the distribution of outputs and/or 
their accuracy across speciﬁed groups. 
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1. Disparate Treatment (Input-Equality) Metrics 
Although disparate treatment is a contested concept, in current doctrine the 
term refers to any intentional differential treatment on the basis of a protected 
characteristic, such as race.
66
 A prohibition on disparate treatment regulates the 
decision-making process itself. In the algorithmic context, the relevant process 
is the formula by which an algorithm produces a risk assessment (or forecast) 
for each individual. There are two possible metrics of process equality that can 
be understood as prohibitions on disparate treatment. 
The ﬁrst possible metric of process equality is colorblindness, which would 
prohibit the use of race as an input variable for prediction (or the intentional use 
of race proxies). The rationale for colorblindness is that if race can affect one’s 
risk score, then there will be some set of people with otherwise identical risk 
prognoses who receive different risk scores on the basis of race.
67
 A mandate of 
colorblindness would align with anticlassiﬁcation conceptions of equality under 
law.
68
 
The second possible process-equality metric is a requirement that two indi-
viduals who present the same statistical risk receive the same risk score. Statisti-
cians refer to this requirement as a single-threshold rule for risk classiﬁcation.
69
 A 
single-threshold rule would prohibit the algorithm from assigning, on the basis 
of race, different scores to two individuals who present the same statistical risk. 
Put conversely, it would require the algorithm to treat individuals who present 
the same statistical risk in the same way. A single-threshold rule might seem 
synonymous with colorblindness, but it is not. Whereas colorblindness prohib-
its consideration of race in the calculation of risk, a single-threshold rule kicks in 
 
66. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (describing disparate treatment as an-
other term for “intentional discrimination”); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-
41 (1976) (holding that differential treatment of people of different races violates the Equal 
Protection Clause only if motivated by “discriminatory racial purpose”). 
67. In practice, “people with otherwise identical risk prognoses” will include people who have 
precisely the same observable risk traits, excluding race. But it may also include two people 
who each have different traits, but who nonetheless present equivalent statistical risk accord-
ing to our best method of estimation. 
68. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassiﬁcation or 
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10-11 (2003) (explaining the distinction between 
the anticlassiﬁcation and the antisubordination approaches to equality law). For this reason, 
Sam Corbett-Davies and Sharad Goel refer to colorblindness as “anti-classiﬁcation.” Sam 
Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Measure and Mismeasure of Fairness: A Critical Review 
of Fair Machine Learning 5 (Aug. 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf
/1808.00023.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PM6-L5MU]. 
69. Huq, supra note 14, at 1116-21; Corbett-Davies & Goel, supra note 68, at 6-8. 
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later in the logic of risk assessment: once an individual’s statistical risk has been 
calculated, it prohibits the algorithm from considering race in deciding how to 
classify that risk—what risk score the person will receive. If a white person who 
poses an 8% chance of rearrest for violent crime is classiﬁed as “high risk,” or as 
a “six” on a six-point risk scale, a black person who poses the same risk must also 
be so classiﬁed, and vice versa. Any two people who present the same risk must 
receive the same score (or classiﬁcation, or forecast). A single-threshold rule pro-
hibits different “cut points” for risk classiﬁcation (or classiﬁcation “thresholds”) 
by race.
70
 
Both colorblindness and a single-threshold rule can be understood to reﬂect 
the Aristotelian notion that similarly situated individuals should be treated alike. 
They just reﬂect different judgments about which individuals are similarly situ-
ated for purposes of risk assessment. Colorblindness presumes that two individ-
uals are similarly situated if they present the same statistical risk, calculated with-
out reference to race. A single-threshold rule presumes that two individuals are 
similarly situated if they present the same statistical risk, calculated with as much 
precision as possible. If race moderates the predictive value of other factors, the 
two can be mutually incompatible.
71
 
2. Disparate Impact (Output-Equality) Metrics 
Disparate impact refers to the differential effects of some decision-making 
process on members of one racial group.
72
 It concerns the fairness of decision-
making outputs. There are many different ways to compare algorithmic outputs 
across racial groups because there are many different ways to measure the “out-
put” of a predictive algorithm. Since these are inherently statistical concepts, it 
is necessary to have a sizable number of the algorithm’s predictions for members 
of each racial group to evaluate an algorithm by any one of these measures and, 
in most cases, to know how many of the predictions were ultimately correct. 
Output-equality metrics align with antisubordination conceptions of equality.
73
 
The following schema presents a core set of potential output-equality met-
rics. Like the ﬁgures above, Figure 4 depicts two groups, gray and black, with 
 
70. Cut points are the statistical risk thresholds set for different risk classes—for instance, the 
classes of “high risk,” “moderate risk,” and “low risk.” See, e.g., Eaglin, supra note 30, at 86. 
71. For a fuller explanation of this possibility, see infra Section III.A. 
72. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2018); Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). 
73. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 68, at 9 (“Antisubordination theorists contend that guarantees 
of equal citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of pervasive social stratiﬁcation and 
argue that law should reform institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social status 
of historically oppressed groups.”). 
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different base rates of the outcome in question—say rearrest for violent crime. 
Assume that the algorithm makes binary rearrest/no-rearrest forecasts. Once 
again, the ﬁgures depicted only in outline will ultimately be rearrested and the 
line represents the algorithm (those persons forecast for rearrest appear to the 
left of the line). 
FIGURE 4. 
GROUPS WITH DIFFERENT BASE RATES OF REARREST, AGAIN 
 
             Predicted rearrest                        Predicted no-rearrest 
a. Statistical Parity 
Statistical parity requires that the same percentage of each group be forecast 
for arrest. That is, it requires parity in the total-population impact of the predic-
tion at issue. This is the simplest measure of intergroup equality. It is also the 
one that dominates disparate impact law. EEOC guidance, for example, provides 
that too great a divergence from statistical parity is prima facie evidence of “ad-
verse impact.”
74
 In our example, the algorithm does not come close to achieving 
statistical parity: 40% of the gray group but only 20% of the black group is fore-
cast for rearrest (the ﬁgures to the left of the line).
75
 Statistical parity is some-
 
74. The “four-ﬁfths rule” provides that 
[a] selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-ﬁfths 
(4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will gener-
ally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, 
while a greater than four-ﬁfths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal en-
forcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact. 
EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2018). 
75. Note that the concept of population impact requires a deﬁnition of the relevant population. 
For purposes of comparing across racial groups, we might be interested in what proportion 
of defendants (for each group) are forecast for rearrest, or what proportion of the total group 
population in the county, or what proportion of some subgroup of defendants. We might, for 
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times called “demographic parity.” Related metrics in the computer-science lit-
erature include the Calders-Verwer (CV) score
76
 and the “p%-rule.”
77
 
b. Predictive Parity 
Predictive parity, the metric that Northpointe emphasized in its debate with 
ProPublica,
78
 measures the algorithm’s rate of accuracy among those who receive 
the same forecast. If the algorithm’s rearrest forecasts are correct at an equal rate 
for each group, the algorithm achieves parity in positive predictive value. If the no-
rearrest forecasts are correct at an equal rate for each group, the algorithm 
achieves parity in negative predictive value. And if both are true, it achieves overall 
predictive parity. Statisticians and computer scientists have also referred to this 
metric of equality as “calibration within groups”
79
 and “conditional use accuracy 
equality.”
80
 In our example in Figure 4, the algorithm achieves parity in positive 
predictive value only. For both the black and the gray groups, 50% of those fore-
cast for rearrest are indeed rearrested (the ﬁgures depicted only in outline and to 
the left of the dividing line). 
c. Equal False-Positive and True-Negative Rates (Equal Speciﬁcity) 
ProPublica, however, argued that equality requires parity in false-positive 
rates. The false-positive rate and its inverse, the true-negative rate, measure the 
 
instance, want to ensure that, among the subgroup of defendants with equivalent criminal 
histories and other “legitimate” predictors of arrest outside of race, the percentage forecast for 
future arrest is the same for each racial group. Scholars call this “conditional statistical parity.” 
E.g., Sam Corbett-Davies et al., Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness 798 
n.2 (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with author). 
76. See Toshihiro Kamishima et al., Fairness-Aware Classiﬁer with Prejudice Remover Regularizer, in 
MACHINE LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY IN DATABASES 35, 37 (Peter A. Flach et al. 
eds., 2012) (deﬁning the CV score as a difference, rather than ratio, of outcome rates between 
two groups). 
77. See Muhammad Bilal Zafar et al., Fairness Constraints: Mechanisms for Fair Classiﬁcation 2 
(2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v54/zafar17a/zafar17a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5V2V-F77E] (generalizing the 80% threshold favored by the EEOC to 
thresholds of any arbitrary p value). 
78. That is, for each racial group, the same percentage of COMPAS’s predictions were correct. 
This was true for each classiﬁcation group—both for those deemed high-risk and for those 
deemed low-risk. 
79. Kleinberg et al., supra note 62, at 4. 
80. Richard Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art, 2018 SOC. 
METHODS & RES. 1, 10. 
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algorithm’s accuracy among those people who are “true negatives”—those who 
are not ultimately rearrested. The false-positive rate is the proportion of such 
people who are nonetheless forecast for rearrest—the law abiders mistakenly 
projected to commit future crime. In our model, it is twice as high for the gray 
group as for the black. Of the seven gray people who will not be rearrested (the 
solid gray ﬁgures), two are mistakenly forecast for rearrest (29%), whereas of 
the eight black people who will not be rearrested (solid black ﬁgures), only one 
is mistakenly forecast for rearrest (12%). The proportion of non-rearrestees who 
are correctly predicted is the true-negative rate (or the algorithm’s “speciﬁc-
ity”).
81
 Statisticians and computer scientists have referred to equal speciﬁcity 
both as “balance for the negative class” and as “predictive equality.”
82
 
There is disagreement about whether this statistical vocabulary for forecast-
ing errors is appropriate to risk assessment. Most risk-assessment tools do not 
actually predict outcomes; they only assess the probability of a future event. If 
an event assessed as likely does not transpire, it does not render the initial prob-
abilistic assessment “false.”
83
 Nonetheless, the binary language of true versus 
false prediction is a helpful heuristic to explain where the costs of uncertainty 
fall. 
d. Equal False-Negative and True-Positive Rates (Equal Sensitivity) 
Whereas speciﬁcity measures the algorithm’s accuracy among the true neg-
atives (people who are not ultimately rearrested), sensitivity measures the algo-
rithm’s accuracy among the true positives—people who are ultimately rearrested. 
The proportion of this group correctly forecast for rearrest is the true-positive 
rate; the proportion mistakenly forecast for no-rearrest is the false-negative rate. 
The false-negative rate, in other words, is the percentage of future arrests that 
an algorithm “misses.” 
Our algorithm does not achieve equal sensitivity. For the gray group, two of 
the three people actually rearrested (the ﬁgures depicted only in outline) are cor-
rectly predicted, so the true-positive rate is 2/3 (67%), and the false-negative rate 
is 1/3 (33%). For the black group, one of the two people actually rearrested (the 
ﬁgures depicted in outline only) is correctly predicted and one is not, so both the 
true-positive and false-negative rates are 1/2 (50%). 
 
81. In our model, this is the percentage of solid ﬁgures correctly left to the right of the dividing 
line (ﬁve of seven gray (71%) and seven of eight black (88%)). 
82. Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 75, at 798 (“predictive equality”); Kleinberg et al., supra note 
62, at 4 (“balance for the negative class”). 
83. For further discussion of this point, see infra note 201 and accompanying text. 
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Computer scientists have referred to parity in true-positive rates as “balance 
for the positive class”
84
 and as “equal opportunity,” because it means that a true 
positive will have an equal chance of being correctly predicted regardless of 
group membership.
85
 The happy language of “equal opportunity” is inapt in the 
criminal justice context, where a “positive” typically means rearrest. It makes 
more sense in assessment contexts where the “positive” outcome predicted is 
something good, like succeeding on the job or repaying a loan. 
A related metric would demand parity in both sensitivity and speciﬁcity. In 
the technical literature, scholars have called this “balance for both classes”; 
“equalized odds”; “conditional procedure accuracy equality”; and “equality of 
opportunity.”
86
 
e. Equal Rate of Correct Classiﬁcation 
It is also possible to conceive of equality as parity in the rate of correct clas-
siﬁcation overall, or the percentage of each group correctly predicted. In our 
model, 70% of the gray ﬁgures are correctly classiﬁed (two actual rearrests—the 
ﬁgures depicted only in outline—to the left of the dividing line, and ﬁve no-re-
arrests to the right of the line). Of the black group, 80% are correctly classiﬁed 
(one actual rearrest to the left of the line and seven no-rearrests to the right).
87
 
Richard Berk and colleagues call parity in the rate of correct classiﬁcation “overall 
accuracy equality.”
88
 
f. Equal Cost Ratios (Ratio of False Positives to False Negatives) 
A last possible metric of equality in terms of error rates is parity in the ratio 
of false positives to false negatives, sometimes called the “cost ratio.” This ratio 
matters because one kind of error may be worse than the other. Incorrectly pre-
dicting future arrest may be worse than incorrectly predicting no future arrest, 
or vice versa. Any algorithm will produce some ratio of false positives to false 
negatives. If stakeholders care what this ratio is, the algorithm can and should 
be designed accordingly. In the development of a predictive algorithm for a pilot 
 
84. Kleinberg et al., supra note 62, at 4. 
85. Moritz Hardt et al., Equality of Opportunity in Supervised Learning, NIPS PROC. (2016), 
https://papers.nips.cc/paper/6374-equality-of-opportunity-in-supervised-learning.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LD25-6RR7]. 
86. See sources cited infra note 96. 
87. Inversely, only 20% of the black group, but 30% of the gray group, is classiﬁed incorrectly. 
88. Berk et al., supra note 80, at 13. 
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project in Philadelphia, for instance, stakeholders determined that missing a new 
arrest for domestic violence was ten times worse than incorrectly predicting a 
new arrest.
89
 Berk and his colleagues, who were building the algorithm, there-
fore designed it to accept ten false positives rather than produce an additional 
false negative. They designed it, in other words, to produce a false positive-to-
negative ratio of 10:1. Parity in cost ratios is also known as “treatment equality.”
90
 
g. Area-Under-the-Curve (AUC) Parity 
There are also a number of measures that express an algorithm’s overall per-
formance at sorting people along a risk spectrum that tool developers frequently 
use to assess, and to claim, “race neutrality.” The most prominent is equality in 
the “area under the receiver operating characteristic curve” (also referred to as 
the “area under the curve,” “AUC,” or area under the “ROC”) for a given tool as 
applied to each racial group. The AUC conveys the probability that, for any two 
people selected at random in the data, the algorithm will correctly order them in 
terms of risk (that is, it will score the higher-risk person as posing a higher risk 
than the other). Parity in AUC scores is yet another measure of equality in pre-
dictive accuracy. 
Table 4 charts these output metrics, their values in the black/gray example, 
and terms for each in the statistics and computer-science literature.
91 
 
89. Berk et al., supra note 62, at 104; see also Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk, 47 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1, 33 (noting that the contrary judgment is also reasonable); Grant T. Harris & Marnie E. 
Rice, Bayes and Base Rates: What Is an Informative Prior for Actuarial Violence Risk Assessment?, 
31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 103, 106 (2013) (“[I]t can be reasonable for public policy to operate on the 
basis that a miss (e.g., failing to detain a violent recidivist beforehand) is twice as costly as a 
false alarm (e.g., detaining a violent offender who would not commit yet another violent of-
fense).”). 
90. Berk et al., supra note 80, at 15. The question of the relative cost of a false positive and false 
negative in the prediction context evokes the famous Blackstone ratio, which asserts a position 
on the relative costs of false negatives and false positives in the context of criminal conviction 
and punishment. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352 (“[T]he law holds, that it 
is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”); cf. Alexander Volokh, 
n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997) (chronicling variants on the Blackstone ratio 
through history); Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, n Dangerous Men (unpublished man-
uscript) (on ﬁle with author) (exploring the analogue of the Blackstone ratio for preventive 
detention). 
91. Like the text above, Table 4 simpliﬁes the relevant concepts in at least three ways. It (1) treats 
risk assessment as binary prediction; (2) ignores the issue of whether the validation data will 
correspond to the population on which the tool is applied; and (3) ignores whether the clas-
siﬁer is an asymptotically unbiased estimator—called the tool’s “estimation accuracy.” See 
Berk et al., supra note 80, at 16. 
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TABLE 4. 
DISPARATE IMPACT (OUTPUT-EQUALITY) METRICS 
Stats. / Comp. Sci. Equality 
Terms 
Parity in . . . Gray Black 
Statistical Parity, Demographic 
Parity (related: Conditional 
Statistical Parity)
92
Population Impact: Percentage 
of group predicted P
40% 20%
Inverse: Percentage predicted N 60% 80%
Predictive Parity, Calibration 
Within Groups, Conditional  
Use Accuracy Equality
93
Positive Predictive Accuracy: 
Percentage of P predictions  
that are correct
50% 50%
Negative Predictive Accuracy: 
Percentage of N predictions that 
are correct
83% 88% 
Balance for the Negative Class, 
Predictive Equality
94
True-Negative Rate (Speciﬁc-
ity): Percentage of Ns correctly 
predicted
71% 88% 
False-Positive Rate: Percentage 
incorrectly predicted 
29% 12%
92. Benjamin Fish et al., A Conﬁdence-Based Approach for Balancing Fairness and Accuracy, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE 2016 SIAM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DATA MINING 144, 144 (Sanjay
Chawla Venkatasubramanian & Wagner Meira eds., 2016) (using the term “statistical par-
ity”); Toshihiro Kamishima et al., Considerations on Fairness-aware Data Mining, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE 2012 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DATA MINING WORKSHOPS 378, 382
(Mohammed J. Zaki et al. eds., 2012) (same); Berk et al., supra note 80, at 13 (same); Huq,
supra note 14, at 1116 (same); Kleinberg et al., supra note 62, at 8 (same); Corbett-Davies &
Goel, supra note 68, at 6 (describing “classiﬁcation parity”); Corbett-Davies et al., supra note
75, at 2 (using the term “conditional statistical parity” to refer to parity in classiﬁcation rates
after controlling for “‘legitimate’ risk factors”); Hardt et al., supra note 85, at 1 (using the term 
“demographic parity”); Richard Zemel et al., Learning Fair Representations, 28 PROC. MACHINE 
LEARNING RES. 1 (2013) (using the term “statistical parity”).
93. Berk et al., supra note 80, at 14 (describing “conditional use accuracy equality”); Kleinberg et
al., supra note 62, at 4 (discussing “calibration within groups”); Corbett-Davies & Goel, supra
note 68, at 2 (describing “calibration”); Dieterich et al., supra note 49 (describing “predictive
parity”); Hardt et al., supra note 85, at 5 (describing “a score that is calibrated within each
group”).
94. Kleinberg et al., supra note 62, at 4 (describing “balance for the negative class”); Corbett-
Davies et al., supra note 75, at 798 (“predictive equality”).
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Stats. / Comp. Sci. Equality 
Terms 
Parity in . . .  Gray Black 
 
Balance for the  
Positive Class, Equal  
Opportunity
95
 
True-Positive Rate (Sensitivity): 
Percentage of Ps correctly  
predicted 
67% 
 
50% 
 
False-Negative Rate: Percentage 
incorrectly predicted 
33% 50% 
Balance for Both Classes, 
Equalized Odds, Conditional 
Procedure Accuracy Equality, 
Equality of Opportunity
96
  
Both True Positive and True 
Negative Rates 
  
Overall Accuracy Equality,
97
 
Overall Procedure Accuracy
98
 
Overall Rate of Correct  
Classiﬁcation: Percentage of 
group correctly predicted 
70% 
 
80% 
 
Inverse: Percentage incorrectly 
predicted 
30% 20% 
Treatment Equality
99
 
Distribution of Errors b/t FP  
& FN (“Cost Ratio”) 
2:1 1:1 
Total Fairness
100
 Everything Above   
D. Trade-offs, Reprise 
An algorithm can be designed to achieve any one of the above metrics of out-
put equality, but not all of them together. That is, an algorithm cannot be de-
signed to achieve “total fairness.” This Section offers a very brief overview of the 
 
95. Kleinberg et al., supra note 62, at 4 (discussing “balance for the positive class”); Hardt et al., 
supra note 85, at 4 (deﬁning “equal opportunity”). 
96. Berk et al., supra note 80, at 13-14 (deﬁning “conditional procedure accuracy equality”); Klein-
berg et al., supra note 62, at 2-3 (discussing “balance” for both classes); Hardt et al., supra note 
85, at 3 (describing “equalized odds”); Matthew Joseph et al., Fair Algorithms for Inﬁnite and 
Contextual Bandits, FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY MACHINE LEARNING 1 
(2016), https://www.fatml.org/media/documents/better_fair_algorithms_for_inﬁnite
_contextual_bandits.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6BG-PDQL] (discussing “equality of oppor-
tunity”). 
97. Berk et al., supra note 80, at 13. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 14-15. 
100. Id. at 15. 
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likely trade-offs between equality and overall accuracy and between different 
metrics of equality. 
1. Equality/Accuracy Trade-offs 
When base rates of the predicted outcome differ across groups, the most ac-
curate algorithm possible will predict that outcome at different rates across 
groups. Imposing certain metrics of output equality will therefore have a cost in 
accuracy. The nature and magnitude of the trade-off will depend on how dra-
matically the underlying base rates diverge and on the nature of the fairness in-
tervention. 
Recent work in computer science has demonstrated this trade-off in practice. 
Sam Corbett-Davies and colleagues explored the possibility of designing a ma-
chine-learning risk-assessment algorithm to achieve three separate metrics of 
fairness, using the same Broward County, Florida data that ProPublica used.
101
 
They found that imposing any one of those metrics compromised the algo-
rithm’s accuracy. The optimal algorithm, from a public-safety perspective, was 
“unconstrained” with respect to group fairness. They concluded that “[a]dher-
ing to past [group] fairness deﬁnitions can substantially decrease public safety; 
conversely, optimizing for public safety alone can produce stark racial dispari-
ties.”
102
 Other studies have offered similar demonstrations.
103
 
2. Equality/Equality Trade-offs 
There are also inescapable trade-offs between different metrics of equality. 
As discussed in Section I.B above, whenever base rates of the event we have un-
dertaken to predict diverge across racial groups, it will be impossible to achieve 
 
101. Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 75, at 798 (constraining the algorithm to produce, respec-
tively, statistical parity, conditional statistical parity, and parity in false-positive rates). 
102. Id. at 797. 
103. See, e.g., Richard Berk, Accuracy and Fairness for Juvenile Justice Risks Assessments, 16 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 175 (2019) (ﬁnding that modifying data to achieve statistical parity produced 
extremely high false-negative rates); Kleinberg et al., supra note 45, at 6; Zachary Lipton et 
al., Does Mitigating ML’s Impact Disparity Require Treatment Disparity?, NIPS PROC. 1 (2018), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1711.07076.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8VF-EY53] (demonstrating that 
enforced blindness to protected traits can have a substantial cost in accuracy); Joan Petersilia 
& Susan Turner, Guideline-Based Justice: Prediction and Racial Minorities, 9 CRIME & JUST. 151, 
174 (1987) (reporting that omitting factors correlated with race from a recidivism prediction 
algorithm signiﬁcantly reduced the accuracy of the model). 
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equality by every metric at once.
104
 To achieve any particular measure of equality, 
it will likely be necessary to sacriﬁce at least one of the others. 
In a recent study, for instance, Richard Berk adjusted juvenile justice data to 
produce statistical parity in predictions of rearrest for violent crime.
105
 This re-
sulted in extremely high rates of false negatives; the algorithm missed 92% of 
violent-crime rearrests of white juveniles and 98% of violent-crime rearrests of 
black juveniles.
106
 Such high false-negative rates are a hefty cost in accuracy in 
and of themselves. But the increase in error also had a disparate racial impact. 
Because the base rate of arrest for violence in this data was signiﬁcantly higher 
among black juveniles than white juveniles,
107
 and because most violent crime is 
intraracial,
108
 the astronomical false-negative rates would mean a much greater 
absolute number of violent-crime arrests missed in the black community than in 
the white community. To the extent that violent-crime arrests correspond to vi-
olent crimes, the effort to achieve statistical parity for black juveniles subject to 
risk assessment comes at the cost of disparate harm to black victims.
109
 
Given the trade-offs between certain equality metrics and overall accuracy, 
and between the equality metrics themselves, what should “equality” mean—
what measure of equality should risk-assessment tools be required to meet? As 
Aziz Huq has thoroughly explained, the law does not answer this question.
110
 
Huq instead suggests a return to ﬁrst principles and a commitment to ensuring 
that predictive programs do not impose a net burden on communities of color.
111
 
 
104. Economics and statistics literature sometimes refers to this phenomenon as the problem of 
infra-marginality. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Outcome Tests of Racial Disparities in Police Practices, 4 
JUST. RES. & POL’Y 131, 135 (2002); Camelia Simoiu et al., The Problem of Infra-Marginality in 
Outcome Tests for Discrimination, 11 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 1193 (2017). 
105. Berk, supra note 103, at 190. 
106. Id. at 186. 
107. Id. at 187. 
108. Rachel E. Morgan, Race and Hispanic Origin of Victims and Offenders, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 2012-
15 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rhovo1215.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2X6 
-N9KK]. 
109. For further illustrations of trade-offs between equality and accuracy, and between different 
equality measures, see Section III.B.2 and the Appendix. Berk and his colleagues have also 
provided another illustration of these equality/accuracy trade-offs, using real arraignment 
data and a machine-learning algorithm that forecasts new arrests for a domestic-violence of-
fense within a period of twenty-one months. The base rate among black defendants was 11%, 
and the base rate among white defendants was 6%. Berk and his colleagues found that, if the 
algorithm is designed to achieve predictive parity with respect to a prediction of no-rearrest, 
the “false negative and false positive rates vary dramatically by race.” Speciﬁcally, the false 
negative rate is 49% for black defendants and 93% for white defendants; the false positive rate 
is 2% for white defendants and 24% for black defendants. Berk et al., supra note 80, at 32. 
110. Huq, supra note 14, at 1055. 
111. Id. at 1111. 
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That commitment is surely worth making. The question is how to design pre-
dictive tools to honor it. And the problem is that no one measure of predictive 
equality can control the impact of prediction in the world. To understand why 
this is so, one must ﬁrst understand the source of the problem: prediction itself. 
i i .  prediction as a mirror  
A. The Premise of Prediction 
There is a simple reason why it is impossible to achieve equality by every 
metric when base rates differ: prediction functions like a mirror. The premise of 
prediction is that, absent intervention, history will repeat itself. So what predic-
tion does is identify patterns in past data and offer them as projections about 
future events. If there is racial disparity in the data, there will be racial disparity 
in prediction too. It is possible to replace one form of disparity with another, but 
impossible to eliminate it altogether. 
This fact about prediction is not unique to actuarial methods. Actuarial pre-
diction reﬂects a particularly crystalline image of visible, quantiﬁed data, 
whereas subjective prediction reﬂects a foggy image of anecdotal data. But sub-
jective and algorithmic prediction alike look to the past as a guide to the future 
and thereby project past inequalities forward. 
The deep problem, in other words, is not algorithmic methodology. Any 
form of prediction that relies on data about the past will produce racial disparity 
if the past data shows the event that we aspire to predict—the target variable—
occurring with unequal frequency across racial groups. And if an algorithm’s 
forecasts are correct at equal rates across racial lines, as were the COMPAS fore-
casts in Broward County,
112
 any disparity in prediction reﬂects disparity in the 
data. To understand and redress disparity in prediction, it is therefore necessary 
to understand how and when racial disparity arises in the data that we look to as 
a representation of past crime. 
B. Racial Disparity in Past-Crime Data 
From a racial equity perspective, the key question for any predictive tool is 
what it predicts: what data point is labeled as a “positive” instance of the target 
variable. Most contemporary criminal justice risk-assessment tools purport to 
 
112. That is, the algorithm achieved predictive parity. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying 
text; supra Table 1. 
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predict future crime.
113
 But that is not actually what they predict. They generally 
predict future arrest.
114
 
The reason that risk-assessment tools predict arrest rather than crime is that 
the data do not allow for direct crime prediction. To determine who is likely to 
commit crime in the future, one would have to look at who has committed crimes 
in the past. But we do not know precisely who has committed crimes in the past. 
Most crimes are never reported; some are reported falsely; and crime reports do 
not reliably identify crime perpetrators. Law enforcement institutions strive to 
identify perpetrators, and toward that end they make arrests, ﬁle charges, and 
seek convictions. These institutional events are documented, but even the best 
law enforcement agency does not make an accurate arrest for every crime. Most 
crimes never result in arrest.
115
 Some arrests are erroneous. The same is true of 
ﬁled charges and of convictions. So our record of past crimes is really a record of 
crime reports and law enforcement actions, and the relationship of that record 
to actual crimes committed is opaque.
116
 Given this fundamental data limitation, 
most contemporary criminal justice risk-assessment tools predict arrest on the 
 
113. See, e.g., Overview of the LSI-R, MULTI-HEALTH SYS., https://www.mhs.com/MHS 
-Publicsafety?prodname=lsi-r [https://perma.cc/AQ8X-5FM7] (purporting to predict, inter 
alia, “recidivism”); Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula, ARNOLD FOUND. 2-3 
(2016), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-and 
-Formula.pdf [https://perma.cc/R62H-HD8Z] (purporting to predict “new criminal activ-
ity”). 
114. Some tools have other target variables, but the analysis in this section applies to many other 
target variables too. In the pretrial context, for instance, risk-assessment tools also predict 
“failure to appear,” deﬁned in terms of data points that vary by jurisdiction. See Mayson, supra 
note 6, at 509-13. There are also risk-assessment instruments that purport to predict violence 
but in fact predict any allegation of violence, whether it results in arrest or not (let alone con-
viction). See, e.g., Min Yang et al., The Efficacy of Violence Prediction: A Meta-Analytic Compar-
ison of Nine Risk Assessment Tools, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 740, 742 (2010) (noting that “[t]he 
range of possible criterion variables for violence is wide, and “includes self-reports to third-
party reports . . . , informal social service or police contact, formal contact or police charges, 
formal adjudication and court convictions, and incarceration”). 
115. Crime in the United States 2017, FBI tbl.425, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime 
-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-25 [perma.cc/G2QQ-F34R] (reporting that, in data from re-
porting law enforcement agencies nationwide, only 45.6% of violent offenses and 17.6% of 
property offenses were cleared by arrest). 
116. Cf. Cathy O’Neill, Commentary: Let’s Not Forget How Wrong Our Crime Data Are, CHI. TRIB. 
(May 25, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec 
-danger-marijuana-legalizing-crime-data-black-youth-facial-bias-0528-story.html [https://
perma.cc/DMU4-XW38] (arguing that crime statistics are a poor proxy for actual crime). 
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premise that it is the best available proxy for crime commission.
117
 A few predict 
arrest for a speciﬁed type of crime, but most assess the likelihood of arrest for 
any offense at all within a designated timespan.
 
The choice to predict arrest has profound consequences for racial equity be-
cause in most places, for nearly all crime categories, arrest rates have been racially 
disparate for decades. The recent DOJ investigations into the Ferguson and Bal-
timore police departments offered two dramatic examples.
118
 But Ferguson and 
Baltimore are not unique. In 2014, a USA Today analysis of FBI data concluded 
that “[a]t least 1,581 other police departments across the USA arrest black people 
at rates even more skewed than in Ferguson.”
119
 The report explained: “Blacks 
are more likely than others to be arrested in almost every city for almost every 
type of crime. Nationwide, black people are arrested at higher rates for crimes as 
serious as murder and assault, and as minor as loitering and marijuana posses-
sion.”
120
 The most recent data are no better. In 2017, the black arrest rate nation-
wide was at least twice as high as the white arrest rate for every crime category 
 
117. Whether arrest is actually the best available proxy for commission of crime is a difficult and 
contested question. See Anna Roberts, Arrest as Guilt, 60 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
(manuscript at 9) (on ﬁle with author). 
118. Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 3 
(2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/ﬁle/883296/download [https://perma.cc/2BHX 
-3QB4] [hereinafter Baltimore Investigation]; Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Po-
lice Department, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 2 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/opa
/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/GFX7-ZDWT] [hereinafter Ferguson Investigation]. 
119. Brad Heath, Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates: “Staggering Disparity,” USA TODAY (Nov. 18, 
2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/18/ferguson-black-arrest 
-rates/19043207 [https://perma.cc/V9MY-K2WN]. 
120. Id. In fact, the aggregate national arrest rate for black people was at least twice as high as the 
aggregate white arrest rate every year from 1980 through 2014. Arrest Data Analysis Tool, BU-
REAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm (click 
“National Estimates,” then “Trend Graphs by Race,” and then select the race and “All of-
fenses”) (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). A similar trend holds among misdemeanors. See Megan 
Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 758-63 
(2018) (ﬁnding that “the [national] black arrest rate [for an index of misdemeanor offenses] 
has hovered around 1.7 times the white arrest rate since 1980”). The starkest disparities may 
be in more serious offense categories. For every year from 1980 through 2012, the black arrest 
rate for what the Bureau of Justice Statistics designates the “violent crime index” was at least 
three times the white arrest rate, and from 1980 through 1989 it was more than six times the 
white arrest rate. Arrest Data Analysis Tool, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index
.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm (click “National Estimates,” then “Trend Graphs by 
Race,” and then select the race and “Violent Crime Index”) (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
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except driving under the inﬂuence, violations of liquor laws, and “drunken-
ness.”
121
 For murder and robbery, the black arrest rate was approximately seven 
times the white arrest rate.
122
 Given these pervasive and persistent trends, it is 
likely that many past-crime data sets will manifest racial disparity in arrest rates 
for many categories of crime. 
C. Two Possible Sources of Disparity 
There are two possible explanations for such disparities. The ﬁrst is that they 
represent a racial distortion relative to the underlying rate of crime commission: 
white and black people commit the crime at equal rates, but racial skew in en-
forcement or reporting practices distorts this ground truth. The second possible 
explanation is that the disparity reﬂects a difference in offending rates across ra-
cial lines. This evokes one of the most pernicious themes in racist ideology—the 
association of blackness with criminality.
123
 Partly for that reason, it is essential 
to differentiate these two possible founts of predictive disparity. Some partici-
pants in the risk-assessment-and-race debate assume that any racial disparity in 
past-crime data reﬂects distortion;
124
 others assume that it reﬂects differences in 
 
121. I calculated 2017 arrest rates by race and offense category using the arrest totals reported in 
the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports series and national population estimates reported by the 
U.S. Census Bureau. These sources have serious limitations, but to my knowledge are the best 
available basis for calculating national arrest rates by race. See Crime in the United States 2017, 
FBI tbl.43A, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages
/tables/table-43 [https://perma.cc/EKG9-YD6G] (showing arrest totals by offense category 
and race in reporting jurisdictions); Quick Facts: Population Estimates, July 1, 2017 (V2017), 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217
#PST045217 [https://perma.cc/989D-GWNG] (reporting that white people constituted 
76.6% of the national population of 325,719,178 (or 249,500,890) and that black people con-
stituted 13.4% (or 43,646,370)). 
122. See Crime in the United States 2017, supra note 121, tbl.43A.  
123. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 137 (1997); KATHERYN RUSSELL-
BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME 128 (1998); cf. Crime in the United States 2017, supra note 121, 
tbl.43A. 
124. See, e.g., Hearing on the Proposed Pennsylvania Risk Assessment Tool for Sentencing 8-9 (June 13, 
2018) (testimony of Mark Houldin, Phila. Def. Ass’n), https://www.hominid.psu.edu 
/specialty_programs/pacs/guidelines/archived-sentence-risk-assessment/testimony/mark-f.
-houldin-policy-director-defenders-association-of-pennsylvania.-harrisburg-june-13-2018
/view [https://perma.cc/VE6Z-TPGN]. 
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underlying crime rates.
125
 So long as these conﬂicting assumptions go unstated, 
the debate cannot proceed. 
Without confronting the two possible sources of disparity, moreover, it is 
impossible to remedy them because each one demands a different response. Dis-
tortions in the data or risk-assessment process can sometimes be corrected. And 
if correction is not possible—if the data cannot be made to reliably reﬂect the 
underlying incidence of crime—then they should not serve as the basis for risk 
assessment at all. But if the data do reliably reﬂect the underlying incidence of 
crime, and predictive disparity ﬂows from a difference in underlying crime rates, 
then the disparity cannot be eliminated within the data or the predictive process. 
Nor is the answer to jettison algorithmic assessment in favor of subjective pre-
diction. So long as the data reliably reﬂect the incidence of some event that is 
worth predicting, algorithmic risk assessment may have a valuable role to play.
126
 
It is thus imperative to acknowledge the two possible sources of predictive 
disparity and strive to identify which one is at issue in any given context. The 
remainder of this Section explains the two possible sources of disparity in more 
detail. 
1. Disparate Law Enforcement Practice? 
There is no question that, in many places, police have disproportionately ar-
rested people of color relative to the rates at which black people and white people, 
respectively, commit crimes. Marijuana arrest rates are an oft-cited example: al-
though black and white people use marijuana at approximately equal rates, black 
people have been arrested for marijuana much more frequently.
127
 This also ap-
pears to be the case with drug arrests overall.
128
 Recent DOJ investigations have 
 
125. See, e.g., id. at 8 (citing research commissioned by the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission 
as interpreting racial differences in arrest rates to reﬂect racial differences in commission 
rates). 
126. Part IV considers this possibility. 
127. The War Against Marijuana in Black and White, ACLU 16-18 (2013), https://www.aclu.org 
/report/report-war-marijuana-black-and-white?redirect=criminal-law-reform/war 
-marijuana-black-and-white [https://perma.cc/S5RY-WUB7]. 
128. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2), Reporters’ Note 31 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final 
Draft 2017) (noting that racial disparities in sentencing that arise from racial skew in law en-
forcement “are largest for crimes at the low end of the seriousness scale—especially drug of-
fenses,” and collecting sources); Lauren Nichol Gase et al., Understanding Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Arrest: The Role of Individual, Home, School, and Community Characteristics, 8 
RACE & SOC. PROBS. 296, 304-08 (2016) (ﬁnding “that racial/ethnic differences in arrest were 
not explained by differences in individual-level delinquent behaviors,” but were explained by 
“neighborhood racial composition”); Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, 13 
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revealed racial disparities in arrest rates in New Orleans, Ferguson, and Balti-
more that are not explicable on the basis of underlying crime rates alone.
129
 Some 
scholars argue that distortions to police data are so pervasive that such data 
should never be taken to reﬂect crime patterns, but should instead be understood 
to document “the practices, policies, biases, and political and ﬁnancial account-
ing needs of a given [police] department.”
130
 
To the extent that racial disparities in past-arrest rates derive from disparate 
law enforcement practice, that distortion makes “future arrest” a racially skewed 
proxy for “future crime.” As between a black and a white defendant who are 
equally likely to commit crime, the black defendant may be more likely to be 
arrested.
131
 Conversely, the fact that a black defendant is more likely to be ar-
rested may not mean she or he is more likely to commit crime. There is thus 
reason to think that tools assessing the likelihood of “any arrest” may be racially 
biased in the sense that a given score—which corresponds to some likelihood of 
 
SIGNIFICANCE 14, 19 (2016) (discussing bias in predictive policing); David Huizinga et al., 
Disproportionate Minority Contact in the Juvenile Justice System: A Study of Differential Minority 
Arrest/Referral to Court in Three Cities, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REF. SYS. 3 (July 28, 2007), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/219743.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KW3-SDE4] (evaluat-
ing longitudinal data from three cities and ﬁnding substantial racial differences in police con-
tact after controlling for differences in self-reported offending). 
129. Baltimore Investigation, supra note 118, at 72 (“In sum, [the Baltimore Police Department]’s 
stops, searches, and arrests disproportionately impact African Americans and predominantly 
African-American neighborhoods and cannot be explained by population patterns, crime 
rates, or other race-neutral factors.”); Ferguson Investigation, supra note 118, at 62-79 (conclud-
ing that dramatic racial disparities in traffic stops, citations, and arrests were “not the neces-
sary or unavoidable results of legitimate public safety efforts” and “stem[med] in part from 
intentional discrimination”); Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the New Orleans Police Depart-
ment, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 34 (Mar. 16, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/crt 
/legacy/2011/03/17/nopd_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5VP-84B7] [hereinafter New Or-
leans Investigation] (ﬁnding “reasonable cause to believe that there is a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional conduct and/or violations of federal law with respect to discriminatory po-
licing”); id. at 39 (concluding that “the level of [racial] disparity [in arrests] for youth is so 
severe and so divergent from nationally reported data that it cannot plausibly be attributed 
entirely to the underlying rates at which these youth commit crimes”); see also Rashida Rich-
ardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Pre-
dictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 192 (2019). 
130. Richardson et al., supra note 129, at 8. 
131. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Par-
adox of Punishment in Minority Communities 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 178-80 (2008); Preeti 
Chauhan et al., Trends in Arrests for Misdemeanor Charges in New York City, 1993-2016, at 21, 
MISDEMEANOR JUST. PROJECT 21 (Feb. 1, 2018), https://misdemeanorjustice.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2018 /01/2018_01_24_MJP.Charges.FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SP33-C6JA]. 
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arrest—will mean a different risk of crime commission for black versus white de-
fendants.
132
 The tool will systematically overstate the riskiness of black men rel-
ative to other groups. Predictive disparities produced by this kind of distortion 
are sometimes called “irrational discrimination,” because the disparity does not 
track the underlying reality of crime rates. 
The most direct solution to this problem is to choose a different target vari-
able, one that better represents the event we want to predict without embedding 
racial skew. In practice, this can be extremely difficult. The complexities are dis-
cussed further in Part III. 
2. Disparate Rates of Crime Commission? 
The second possible explanation for racial disparity in past-arrest rates is a 
difference in the underlying incidence of crime. This possibility arises because 
crime is the product of complex social and economic determinants that, in a race- 
and class-stratiﬁed society, may also correlate with demographic traits. Where 
that is so, the incidence of a given type of crime may vary among demographic 
groups. A number of recent studies have found, for instance, that contemporary 
white and Hispanic college students use illicit drugs at signiﬁcantly higher rates 
than African American and Asian students.
133
 White men have committed the 
vast majority of mass shootings in the United States during the last thirty 
years.
134
 Nationwide ﬁrearm homicide rates have been higher in recent decades 
in black communities than in white ones, but the degree of disparity varies by 
 
132. See, e.g., Kristian Lum, Limitations of Mitigating Judicial Bias with Machine Learning, 1 NATURE 
HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2017). 
133. See, e.g., Sean Esteban McCabe et al., Race/Ethnicity and Gender Differences in Drug Use and 
Abuse Among College Students, 6 J. ETHNICITY SUBSTANCE ABUSE 75 (2007) (providing “strong 
evidence from one university that Hispanic and White undergraduate students were at in-
creased risk for drug use and abuse” and chronicling related literature). 
134. Number of Mass Shootings in the United States between 1982 and November 2018, by Shooter’s Race 
and Ethnicity, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/476456/mass-shootings-in-the 
-us-by-shooter-s-race [https://perma.cc/238C-PVZR]. 
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state.
135
 High-stakes ﬁnancial crimes are disproportionately committed by peo-
ple working in the upper echelons of ﬁnancial-services ﬁrms, and these individ-
uals are disproportionately white men.
136
 
In the Broward County data, as well as several other data sets used in recent 
risk-assessment studies, arrest rates for offenses designated as “violent” were 
higher among the black population than the white population.
137
 Jennifer Skeem 
and Christopher Lowenkamp have opined that the disparity represents differen-
tial offending rates rather than differential enforcement.
138
 This Article does not 
take any position on whether that is so; I have neither the data nor the expertise 
to judge. 
The point is that if underlying offense rates do vary by race in the data on 
which a given algorithm is built, racial disparity in prediction is unavoidable. 
The reason, once again, is that prediction functions as a mirror. If the black pop-
ulation in the relevant data is statistically riskier with respect to the designated 
crime category, risk-assessment tools will reﬂect as much. If the mirror is modi-
ﬁed to ignore this statistical fact, that very blindness will have disparate racial 
 
135. See, e.g., Alexia Cooper & Erica L. Smith, Homicide Trends in the United States, 1980-2008, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. 11 (Nov. 2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf [https://
perma.cc/88XB-M3ZV]; Michael Planty & Jennifer L. Truman, Firearm Violence, 1993-2011, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. 5 (May 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fv9311.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B2Y4-5XSW] (showing rates of ﬁrearm victimization by race); see also Corinne A. 
Riddell et al., Comparison of Rates of Firearm and Nonﬁrearm Homicide and Suicide in Black and 
White Non-Hispanic Men, by U.S. State, 168 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 712 (2018). 
136. See Brian Clifton et al., Predicting Financial Crime: Augmenting the Predictive Policing Arsenal, 
NEW INQUIRY (Apr. 25, 2017), https://whitecollar.thenewinquiry.com/static/whitepaper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QS9Y-JDG6] (synthesizing data on location of ﬁnancial crimes); cf. Stacy 
Jones, White Men Account for 72% of Corporate Leadership at 16 of the Fortune 500 Companies, 
FORTUNE (June 9, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/06/09/white-men-senior-executives 
-fortune-500-companies-diversity-data [https://perma.cc/67YB-ZYKR]; Susan E. Reed, 
Corporate Boards Are Diversifying. The C-suite Isn’t., WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/outlook/corporate-boards-are-diversifying-the-c-suite-isnt/2019/01
/04/c45c3328-0f02-11e9-8938-5898adc28fa2 [https://perma.cc/X3YL-HXLG]. Clifton, 
Lavigne, and Tseng offer a new predictive technology “trained on incidents of ﬁnancial mal-
feasance from 1964 to the present day, collected from the Financial Industry Regulatory Au-
thority (FINRA).” Brian Clifton et al., White Collar Crime Risk Zones, NEW INQUIRY (Apr. 26, 
2017), https://thenewinquiry.com/white-collar-crime-risk-zones [https://perma.cc/2K85 
-3VCP]. 
137. Dieterich et al., supra note 49; see also Berk, supra note 103; Flores et al., supra note 49; Skeem 
& Lowenkamp, supra note 38, at 689-90. 
138. Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 38, at 690 (opining that arrest for a “violent offense” is a 
“valid criterion” free from racial skew in law enforcement); see also Alex R. Piquero et al., A 
Systematic Review of Age, Sex, Ethnicity, and Race as Predictors of Violent Recidivism, 59 INT’L J. 
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 5, 17 (2015) (ﬁnding “that age, sex, and 
race . . . were signiﬁcantly related to violent recidivism”). 
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impact: in treating the black and white groups subject to assessment as statisti-
cally identical, the tools will “miss” more of the designated crimes committed by 
black individuals—crimes that, because most crime is intraracial, will dispropor-
tionately befall communities of color.
139
 No matter how we alter the data or al-
gorithm, then, inequality in commission rates for the crime(s) we undertake to 
predict will produce inequality in prediction. 
It is important, in considering this possibility, to recognize what any such 
difference in crime commission rates would and would not signify. Differential 
crime rates do not signify a difference across racial groups in individuals’ innate 
“propensity” to commit crime.
140
 They signify social and economic divides. 
Where the incidence of crimes of poverty and desperation varies by race, it is 
because society has segregated communities of color and starved them of re-
sources and opportunity.
141
 Where race and gender differences exist in the rate 
of high-stakes ﬁnancial crime, it is because white men retain control of the levers 
of high-stakes ﬁnance.
142
 Crime rates are a manifestation of deeper forces; racial 
variance in crime rates, where it exists, manifests the enduring social and eco-
nomic inequality produced by centuries of racial subordination. 
3. The Broader Framework: Distortion Versus Disparity in the Event of 
Concern 
The two possible sources of racial disparity in past-arrest rates—differential 
enforcement and differential offending—belong to a broader framework. There 
 
139. This was the scenario in the example from the Berk study. See supra notes 105-109 and accom-
panying text. 
140. The notion that differential crime rates signal a difference in innate criminal propensity has 
been a central justiﬁcation for racist ideology and practices. See generally, e.g., KENNEDY, supra 
note 123, at 12-17 (analyzing race relations in the administration of criminal justice); RUSSELL-
BROWN, supra note 123 (discussing race, crime, and law, beginning with slavery in the United 
States). 
141. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) cmt. k (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017) 
(“Serious crime rates, and victimization rates, are highest in America’s most disadvantaged 
communities, which overwhelmingly are minority communities.”); id. (citing sources on “the 
multiple causes of high crime rates in disadvantaged communities,” along with research 
demonstrating that “the ‘underclass’ status of a community is associated with high crime rates 
among those who live there, regardless of race and ethnicity”); MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE 
COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP (2017); KENNEDY, supra note 
123. This is not to disclaim all individual responsibility for criminal acts. But individual re-
sponsibility for particular acts does not amount to group responsibility for group crime rates. 
142. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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are always two fundamentally distinct kinds of explanation for intergroup dis-
parities in predictions: (1) distortion in the data or predictive process, and (2) 
an actual difference, across group lines, in the historical base rate of the event we 
want to predict. 
Distortion can take many forms. In the criminal justice context, the choice of 
a proxy target variable with racial skew (i.e., “any arrest” as a proxy for “com-
mission of serious crime”) may be the most important.
143
 But racial distortion 
can also result if the data are systematically less reliable for one racial group than 
for another. This problem can arise if the data are simply more limited for one 
racial group.
144
 Another potential source of distortion in prediction is intentional 
manipulation of the data or algorithm to disadvantage one racial group—what 
Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst call “masking.”
145
 There is no evidence that 
this is a serious concern in the context of contemporary criminal justice risk as-
sessment.
146
 There are also ways to prevent it from becoming one. So long as the 
data on the basis of which tools are developed and validated are made public, as 
they should be, independent researchers can replicate the tool-design and vali-
dation process and check for signs of racist manipulation. 
In addition to these sources of distortion in predictions themselves, system 
actors can introduce racial distortion in responding to risk. A recent study by 
Megan Stevenson concludes that, when pretrial risk assessment was imple-
mented in Kentucky, judges in rural and largely white counties responded to risk 
 
143. Corbett-Davies and Goel call this problem “label bias” and diagnose it as “perhaps the most 
serious obstacle facing fair machine learning.” Corbett-Davies & Goel, supra note 68, at 18. 
144. An algorithm developed for maximum accuracy will conform to the majority data, and may 
be less accurate for members of the underrepresented group. See, e.g., Sue Shellenbarger, A 
Crucial Step for Avoiding AI Disasters, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2019, 9:57 AM ET), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/a-crucial-step-for-avoiding-ai-disasters-11550069865?ns=prod/accounts 
-wsj [https://perma.cc/C28U-LAAE] (explaining this phenomenon and how diverse devel-
opment teams are more alert to unrepresentative data sets). Tool designers can ameliorate this 
problem by weighting the minority-group data more heavily, by developing separate algo-
rithms for each racial group, or by endeavoring to include more data to equalize group repre-
sentation in the data set. See Sukarna Barua et al., MWMOTE—Majority Weighted Minority 
Oversampling Technique for Imbalanced Data Set Learning, 26 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON 
KNOWLEDGE & DATA ENGINEERING 405, 405-06 (2014). For a possible example of this phe-
nomenon, see Hamilton, supra note 27 (manuscript at 29, 10), which demonstrates that COM-
PAS was signiﬁcantly less accurate for Hispanic than for white defendants by several measures 
and suggesting that smaller numbers of Hispanic defendants might be the cause. 
145. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 3, at 692-93. They call it “masking” because machine-learning 
technologies offer opportunities to intentionally distort an algorithm in ways that are difficult 
to detect. Id. 
146. See Huq, supra note 14, at 1090. 
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scores differently than did judges in urban counties with a greater black popula-
tion, with the result that the new process disproportionately beneﬁtted white 
defendants.
147
 In terms of actual outcomes, this potential source of disparity may 
be the most important of all. 
Each of these mechanisms of distortion—a target variable with racial skew, 
race-speciﬁc data ﬂaws, masking, and a race-skewed response to prediction—
can be addressed in the risk-assessment process. In theory each can be elimi-
nated, although doing so in reality presents challenges. Of them, the target-var-
iable problem and the possibility of a race-skewed response seem by far the most 
signiﬁcant sources of racial distortion in current practice. 
* * * 
In sum, ﬁguring out the nature of the disparity in any predictive context is a 
necessary ﬁrst step in redressing it. Disparities produced through distortion can, 
at least in theory, be eliminated within a risk-assessment system itself. If they 
cannot, then the very core of the risk-assessment enterprise is compromised, and 
it should be abandoned. Disparities that ﬂow from differential crime rates cannot 
be eliminated within the risk-assessment system. Unlike in the case of distortion, 
however, such disparity does not mean that the project of risk assessment is com-
promised and should be abandoned. If the data accurately represent crime rates, 
risk assessment can provide valuable information. That information will be in-
herently unequal, and so presents a difficult dilemma—but one that is neverthe-
less important to confront. 
This is not to say that it will always be possible to disentangle distortion from 
differential crime rates. It sometimes may not be, as Part III discusses in more 
depth. That reality, too, is important to confront because the question of how to 
proceed in such circumstances demands moral and policy judgment. Relatedly, 
acknowledging that crime rates vary across demographic groups for different 
crime categories helps to foreground the policy question of what kinds of crime 
we ought to predict.
148
 The categories of “violent” or “serious” crime are them-
selves cultural constructs, and the way that stakeholders deﬁne them for pur-
poses of risk assessment will have profound demographic implications. 
These are the reasons why it is important to distinguish between distortion 
and differential offense rates as possible sources of racial disparity in prediction. 
 
147. See Stevenson, supra note 6. 
148. See, e.g., Timothy R. Schnacke, “Model” Bail Laws: Re-Drawing the Line Between Pretrial Release 
and Detention, CTR. FOR LEGAL & EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES 12-13 (Apr. 18, 2017), https://
www.clebp.org/images/04-18-2017_Model_Bail_Laws_CLEPB_.pdf [https://perma.cc
/WP33-359T] (emphasizing the importance of deﬁning the relevant risks in the context of 
pretrial risk assessment). 
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Whatever the source, though, the three strategies most commonly advocated to 
redress predictive disparity are off the mark. Part III explains why. 
i i i .  no easy fixes  
As the risk-assessment-and-race debate accelerates, critics increasingly argue 
for three strategies to promote racial equity in prediction. The ﬁrst is the exclu-
sion of both race and factors heavily correlated with race as input variables.
149
 
The second is “algorithmic affirmative action”: some intervention in the design 
of a predictive algorithm to equalize its outputs, by one or more of the metrics 
enumerated above.
150
 In particular, advocates have urged intervention to ensure 
an equal rate of adverse predictions across racial groups (statistical parity),
151
 or 
equal error rates among those in each racial group who have the same outcome 
(parity in false-positive and false-negative rates).
152
 The discussion here will use 
the term “algorithmic affirmative action” to refer to these proposals collectively, 
acknowledging that this shorthand is reductive. Lastly, critics argue that if algo-
rithms cannot be made race neutral, the criminal justice system should reject al-
gorithmic methods altogether.
153
 
 
149. E.g., Chander, supra note 43, at 1039 (urging advocates to focus on “inputs and outputs” rather 
than algorithms themselves); Huq, supra note 14, at 1080 (discussing “the [p]roblem of 
[d]istorting [f]eature [s]election”); Danielle Kehl et al., Algorithms in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem: Assessing the Use of Risk Assessments in Sentencing, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & 
SOC’Y 34 (2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33746041/2017-07 
_responsivecommunities_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V6D-JLLM] (“Critical issues also need 
to be addressed in the development phase of these algorithms, particularly with regard to the 
inputs and how they are used.”). 
150. See, e.g., Chander, supra note 43, at 1039-41 (calling for “algorithmic affirmative action”). 
151. E.g., Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 75 (identifying statistical parity as a “popular” deﬁnition 
of fairness in the risk-assessment and algorithmic-fairness literature); Michael Feldman et al., 
Certifying and Removing Disparate Impact (July 16, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.3756.pdf [https://perma.cc/NNQ4-NHUH] (an early work in the 
algorithmic-fairness literature that adopts a statistical-parity metric). 
152. E.g., Angwin et al., supra note 1 (criticizing disparity in false-positive rates as unjustiﬁed bias); 
see also Katherine Freeman, Algorithmic Injustice: How the Wisconsin Supreme Court Failed to 
Protect Due Process Rights in State v. Loomis, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 75, 86 (2016) (same). 
153. E.g., John Ralphing, Human Rights Watch Advises Against Using Proﬁle-Based Risk Assessment 
in Bail Reform, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 17, 2017, 12:00 AM EDT), https://www.hrw.org
/news/2017/07/17/human-rights-watch-advises-against-using-proﬁle-based-risk 
-assessment-bail-reform [https://perma.cc/95PJ-DBY4]; Use of Pretrial “Risk Assessment” In-
struments, supra note 42. 
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This Part argues that all three of these strategies are misguided. Though well 
intentioned, they have the potential to compromise the goal of racial equity ra-
ther than to further it.
154
 
A. Regulating Input Variables
155
 
Input variables are often cited as the primary concern in the quest for racial 
equity in risk assessment. It is an almost-universal orthodoxy, in fact, that race 
must be excluded as an input to prediction.
156
 Many people extend this principle 
to variables that correlate with race in a given locale, like zip code.
157
 The under-
lying concern is that the use of such factors will produce higher risk scores for 
black defendants and thereby compound historical racial oppression. 
This focus on input variables, however, is not an effective approach to achiev-
ing racial equity.
158
 The most basic reason is that excluding race and race proxies 
might actually hurt black defendants. In this context, as elsewhere, being blind 
to race can mean being blind to racism. As Justice Sotomayor replied to Chief 
Justice Roberts, the “way to stop discriminating on the basis of race” is not to 
ignore race, but rather to apply law and develop policy “with eyes open to the 
unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination.”
159
 
 
154. A comprehensive review of the “fair machine learning” literature by two scholars well versed 
in the ﬁeld was developed contemporaneously with this Article, and arrived at much the same 
conclusions. See generally Corbett-Davies & Goel, supra note 68 (surveying popular fairness 
metrics, explaining their limitations, and advocating for “single-threshold” classiﬁcation rules 
instead). Aziz Huq has also recently offered a set of nuanced prescriptions for racial equity in 
algorithmic criminal justice, grounded by the principle that predictive programs should strive 
to avoid imposing any net burden on communities of color. Huq, supra note 14, at 1129; see 
also infra text accompanying note 274-275 (discussing the difference between Huq’s proposal 
and the proposal offered by this Article). 
155. I explore this subject matter more comprehensively in a follow-on article: Sandra G. Mayson, 
Algorithmic Fairness and the Myth of Colorblindness (Jan. 10, 2019) (unpublished manu-
script) (on ﬁle with author). 
156. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 30, at 812 (“There appears to be a general consensus that using race 
would be unconstitutional.”). 
157. E.g., Corbett-Davies & Goel, supra note 68, at 8 (“[S]everal papers have suggested algorithms 
that enforce a broad notion of anti-classiﬁcation, which prohibits not only the explicit use of 
protected traits but also the use of potentially suspect ‘proxy’ variables.”). 
158. Accord id. at 9-17. 
159. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Se-
attle School District No. 1, declared that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race 
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion). 
Justice Sotomayor rejoined, seven years later, that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the 
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A simple example illustrates. When I worked in New Orleans as a public 
defender, the signiﬁcance of arrest there varied by race. If a black man had three 
arrests in his past, it suggested only that he had been living in New Orleans. 
Black men were arrested all the time for trivial things. If a white man, however, 
had three past arrests, it suggested that he was really bad news! White men were 
hardly ever arrested; three past arrests indicated a highly unusual tendency to 
attract law enforcement attention.
160
 A race-blind algorithm would not observe 
this difference. It would treat the two men as posing an identical risk. The algo-
rithm could not consider the arrests in the context of disparate policing patterns 
and recognize that arrests were a much less signiﬁcant indicator of risk for a black 
man than for a white man.
161
 It would perpetuate the historical inequality by 
overestimating the black man’s relative riskiness and underestimating the rela-
tive riskiness of the white man. 
A colorblind algorithm might therefore discriminate on the basis of race. In 
a shallow sense, the colorblind algorithm avoids racially disparate treatment. It 
treats two people with otherwise identical risk proﬁles exactly the same. In a 
deeper sense, though, the algorithm does engage in disparate treatment on the 
basis of race. In failing to recognize that the context of race powerfully affects the 
signiﬁcance of past arrests, it inﬂates the black man’s risk score and deﬂates the 
white man’s relative to their true values. 
In statistical terms, the problem is that, as a result of disparate law enforce-
ment practices, race might moderate the predictive value of certain variables (or 
the algorithm as a whole), such that the algorithm overestimates risk for black 
people relative to white people.
162
 A few risk-assessment-tool developers have 
 
basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitu-
tion with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination.” Schuette 
v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1676 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
160. Cf. New Orleans Investigation, supra note 129, at ix-x (ﬁnding “racial disparities in arrests of 
whites and African Americans in virtually all categories, with particularly dramatic disparity 
for African-American youth”); id. at x (“The level of disparity for youth in New Orleans is so 
severe and so divergent from nationally reported data that it cannot plausibly be attributed 
entirely to the underlying rates at which these youth commit crimes . . . .”). 
161. Michael Tracy makes an analogous argument for providing capital juries statistical infor-
mation about how much more likely prosecutors are to seek the death penalty for black de-
fendants. Michael Tracy, Race as a Mitigating Factor in Death Penalty Sentencing, 7 GEO. J.L. & 
MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 151, 159 (2015) (arguing that if jurors are aware of this disparity, 
a black defendant “may seem less deserving of a death sentence”). 
162. This situation arises in every predictive context. In education testing, for instance, it is well 
established that the correlation between SAT scores and intelligence varies by race and by 
circumstance. See, e.g., Harold Berlak, Race and the Achievement Gap, in CRITICAL SOCIAL IS-
SUES IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: DEMOCRACY AND MEANING IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 223, 227 
(H. Svi Shapiro & David E. Purpel eds., 3d ed. 2005) (discussing the racial achievement gap 
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encountered the problem in practice, discovering that variables like past arrests 
or misdemeanor convictions are less predictive for black people.
163
 The usual re-
sponse is simply to eliminate the problematic input variables from the model. 
But that solution has a cost in accuracy,
164
 which might fall disproportionately 
on communities of color, as discussed at greater length below.
165
 
The alternative is to allow an algorithm to assess the signiﬁcance of risk fac-
tors contingent on race. If race moderates the factors’ predictive value, this would 
lower average risk scores for black defendants. It would achieve what a group of 
computer scientists have dubbed “fairness through awareness.”
166
 And it would 
improve, rather than compromise, the tool’s accuracy. Under these circum-
stances, including race as an input variable would promote accuracy and racial 
equity at the same time.
167
 This approach is not feasible for simple checklist 
tools, but it could be for the machine-learning programs that represent the fu-
ture.
168
 
 
in other standardized tests). A high score achieved by a student who beneﬁted from the best 
possible primary education and extensive SAT preparation likely means less about her native 
intelligence than the same score achieved by a student who did not. 
163. Richard Berk and Marie Van Nostrand, along with others, have each reported ﬁnding, in dif-
ferent data sets, that past misdemeanor convictions were less predictive of future serious arrest 
for people of color than for white people. Berk, supra note 103, at 183; Christopher T. Low-
enkamp et al., Investigating the Impact of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes, LAURA & 
JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. (Nov. 2013), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_state-sentencing_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9JF 
-KEHL]. The Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission recently rejected past arrests entirely as 
input variables because they had such different predictive signiﬁcance across racial lines. Risk 
Assessment Update: Arrest Scales, PA. COMMISSION ON SENT’G 4-7 (Feb. 28, 2018), http://www
.hominid.psu.edu/specialty_programs/pacs/publications-and-research/research-and 
-evaluation-reports/risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/32WY-9F74]. 
164. The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, for instance, has elected to rely on past con-
viction rather than past-arrest data despite the fact that it renders the model less accurate 
overall. See Risk Assessment Update: Arrest Scales, supra note 163, at 1. 
165. See infra Section III.B.2. 
166. Cynthia Dwork et al., Fairness Through Awareness (Nov. 30, 2011) (unpublished manu-
script), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1104.3913.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8QE-27NY]. 
167. See Kim, supra note 43, at 918 (“If the goal is to reduce biased outcomes, then a simple prohi-
bition on using data about race or sex could be either wholly ineffective or actually counter-
productive due to the existence of class proxies and the risk of omitted variable bias.”); Lipton 
et al., supra note 103 (arguing on the basis of statistical examples that a prohibition on race or 
sex data is counterproductive); Corbett-Davies & Goel, supra note 68, at 9 (explaining the 
“[l]imitations of anti-classiﬁcation” as a fairness metric). 
168. See Jon Kleinberg et al., Algorithmic Fairness, 108 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 22, 23 (2018) (demon-
strating, with national data, that including race as an input variable to a machine-learning 
college-admissions algorithm both “improves predicted GPAs of admitted students” and can 
increase “the fraction of admitted students who are black”). 
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In fact, to achieve any speciﬁc form of output equality, it may be necessary to 
treat race as an input. To equalize false-positive rates across racial groups, for 
example, it will likely be necessary to have race-speciﬁc risk thresholds for each 
risk class—which is to say that the algorithm will treat people who pose the same 
risk differently on the basis of race.
169
 The same is likely true for equalizing cost 
ratios across racial groups.
170
 To achieve predictive parity, it may be necessary to 
manipulate the data to cancel out the effect of race on other observable varia-
bles,
171
 or to assess the predictive import of every input variable contingent on 
race. As Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst have noted, algorithmic prediction 
thus offers a particularly clear window on the conﬂict between anticlassiﬁcation 
and antisubordination conceptions of equality.
172
 
Yet neither excluding race and race-correlated factors nor including them can 
equalize outcomes entirely if the event we have undertaken to predict—the target 
variable—correlates with race itself. So long as the target variable correlates with 
race, regulating input data is futile. If the event we have undertaken to predict 
happens with greater frequency to people of color, a competent algorithm will 
predict it with greater frequency for people of color. Whatever input data are 
made available, the facts that correlate with the target variable—and therefore 
 
169. See, e.g., Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 75; Hardt et al., supra note 85. 
170. Berk, supra note 103, at 185-86 (explaining that, to equalize cost ratios across racial groups in 
a juvenile risk-assessment context, the author “separate[d] forecasting exercises” for white 
and black juveniles, respectively, and that the machine-learning forecasting algorithms the 
data produced were different for each racial group). 
171. There are different ways to attempt this, and many risk-assessment-tool developers do. Marie 
VanNostrand, who has developed several of the checklist pretrial risk-assessment tools in cur-
rent use, searches for risk factors that are equally predictive across racial lines and discards 
those that are not. Telephone Interview with Marie VanNostrand (Oct. 20, 2016) (notes on 
ﬁle with author). This approach is straightforward, but could have a steep cost in overall ac-
curacy. See Richard Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art, 
SOC. METHODS & RES. 12-18 (July 2, 2018), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177
/0049124118782533 [https://perma.cc/LB82-47SB]. 
172. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 3, at 723 (explaining that “[d]ata mining discrimination will force 
a confrontation between the two divergent principles underlying antidiscrimination law: an-
ticlassiﬁcation and antisubordination”). For an introduction to anticlassiﬁcation and antisub-
ordination principles, see, for example, Balkin & Siegel, supra note 68, at 10; Helen Norton, 
The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 197, 206-15 (2010); and Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Im-
pact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 509-15 (2003) (discussing the normative grounds 
underlying racial-classiﬁcation decisions). This theme will be explored at greater length in 
Mayson, supra note 155. 
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become the algorithm’s predictors—will also correlate with race because the tar-
get variable does.
173
 The only way to break the race correlation is by compromis-
ing the algorithm’s ability to predict the target variable. Excluding criminal-his-
tory data, for instance, might dramatically reduce the disparate racial impact of 
predicting future arrest, but it will also dramatically compromise the algorithm’s 
ability to predict future arrest. To eliminate racial disparity in the prediction of a 
racially disparate event is to undermine the predictive tool. 
Some readers may feel that weakening predictive tools is a good thing. If a 
tool predicts a race-skewed target variable like “any arrest,” for example, the tool 
has dubious value to begin with. In that situation, though, the better answer is 
to stop predicting the meaningless event entirely.
174
 And if the target variable 
does not embed racial distortion, then undermining the predictive tool can be 
counterproductive because the loss in accuracy may inﬂict proportionally more 
“errors” on black communities than on white ones.
175
 
The larger point is that colorblindness is not a meaningful measure of equal-
ity. It can exacerbate rather than mitigate racial disparity in prediction.
176
 And 
even if it does mitigate disparity in prediction, that improvement may come at a 
cost to accuracy that itself has a racially disparate impact. As long as the target 
variable correlates with race, predictions will be racially uneven—or they will be 
so distorted as to be useless. In those circumstances, colorblindness is at best a 
superﬁcial, and at worst a counterproductive, strategy for racial equity.
177
 
B. Equalizing (Some) Outputs 
Algorithmic affirmative action has similar shortcomings. As noted, for pur-
poses of this discussion “algorithmic affirmative action” refers to an intervention 
to produce statistical parity, equal false-positive rates, or equal false-negative 
 
173. See Corbett-Davies & Goel, supra note 68, at 9 (noting that “nearly every covariate commonly 
used in predictive models is at least partially correlated with protected group status; and in 
many situations, even strongly correlated”). 
174. See infra Section III.B.1. 
175. See infra Section III.B.2 and Appendix. 
176. See Huq, supra note 14, at 1100; Kim, supra note 43, at 867 (“[I]f the goal is to discourage 
classiﬁcation bias, then the law should not forbid the inclusion of race, sex, or other sensitive 
information as variables, but seek to preserve these variables, and perhaps even include them 
in some complex models.”); Kroll et al., supra note 25, at 693-95. 
177. Cf. Mayson, supra note 155; David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 
99, 114 (“The one option that is not open is the ideal of colorblindness—treating race as if it 
were, like eye color, a wholly irrelevant characteristic. That is because it is not a wholly irrele-
vant characteristic. Race correlates with other things . . . .”). 
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rates. The stakes of such interventions depend on whether the disparity they 
seek to redress is a product of distortion in the data or of a difference in under-
lying crime rates by race. In either case, though, the interventions fall short. 
1. Equalizing Outputs to Remedy Distortion 
First, consider algorithmic affirmative action designed to remedy racial dis-
tortion in the data vis-à-vis the event we aspire to predict. In the context of crim-
inal justice risk assessment, the gravest concern is that racial disparity in overall 
arrest rates reﬂects disparate law enforcement, rather than disparate rates of of-
fending. If this is true, and what we assess is the likelihood of arrest, then risk 
scores will overstate the risk posed by black men relative to the risk of actual 
crime commission. The goal of algorithmic affirmative action is to adjust the data 
to cancel out this racial distortion in arrest rates.
178
 
This strategy presumes that the scale of the distortion is known. If so, it 
should indeed be possible to cancel it out, although there are technical complex-
ities. But it is hardly ever the case that the scale of the distortion is known.
179
 
The reason we resort to arrest as a proxy for crime commission in the ﬁrst place 
is that we cannot see crime commission directly. Given this reality, the more di-
rect solution to the problem is simply to avoid target variables that are likely to 
be racially skewed with respect to the thing we care about.
180
 If arrest risk does 
not correspond to serious-crime risk, we should stop measuring it. It does not 
tell us what we want to know in any case. The average arrest offense is too insig-
niﬁcant to have much probative value, and the racial skew in arrest rates relative 
to offending rates is too prejudicial.
181
 
 
178. See Berk, supra note 103, at 189 (considering data modiﬁcations along these lines); cf. Sorelle 
A. Friedler et al., On the (Im)Possibility of Fairness (Sept. 23, 2016) (unpublished manu-
script), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.07236 [https://perma.cc/BP4U-N7KM] (raising a simi-
lar scenario with respect to SAT scores and college-admissions algorithms designed to assess 
students’ academic potential). 
179. See, e.g., Laurel Eckhouse et al., Layers of Bias: A Uniﬁed Approach for Understanding Problems 
with Risk Assessment, 46 CRIM. J. & BEHAV. 185, 197 (2019) (“The magnitude and pattern of 
the bias in the data cannot be measured directly with the techniques used by ProPublica, 
Northpointe, or any of the others studying these models, including us.”). 
180. Principles for the Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures, SOC’Y FOR INDUS. & 
ORG. PSYCHOL., INC. 33 (2003), https://www.siop.org/_principles/principles.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4FJR-47TC] (“Conﬁdence in the criterion measure is a prerequisite for an analysis 
of predictive bias.”). 
181. See Mayson, supra note 6, at 562; Roberts, supra note 117, at 4-13; Schnacke, supra note 148, at 
110-14; Slobogin, supra note 9, at 591; Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 43, at 29-31. 
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Risk-assessment tools should instead predict something closer to the harm 
we actually want to avoid.
182
 The challenge is to identify that harm, both con-
ceptually and in data.
183
 I have argued elsewhere that risk-assessment tools 
should assess the risk of violent crime,
184
 but that category is amorphous—does 
it include burglary? a bar ﬁght? driving under the inﬂuence?—and its relative 
importance is contestable; perhaps we should be equally concerned with the risk 
of ﬁnancial crime.
185
 The point is that the decision about what to predict is a 
momentous one and should be made based on law and considered policy judg-
ment, rather than on what data are most readily available.
186
 
We should also acknowledge that resorting to more speciﬁc target variables 
may not solve the problem. To begin with, it may not be possible to produce 
useful predictions of low-frequency events like violent crime. The Pennsylvania 
Commission on Sentencing, to its credit, recently concluded that it could not 
predict future violence with sufficient accuracy to justify handing risk scores to 
judges.
187
 When sufficiently accurate prediction is not possible, we should not 
resort to predicting a more statistically signiﬁcant event but should simply rec-
ognize that our objectives exceed our ability. 
Narrow target variables, moreover, may still embed racial distortion with re-
gard to the actual harm of concern. Violent-crime arrest remains an inexact 
proxy for violent crime itself. Police sometimes arrest the wrong person. Many 
violent crimes never lead to arrest at all. There may therefore still be racial skew 
between arrest rates and underlying offense rates. This might be so even if arrest 
 
182. For a thoughtful discussion of the “risk of what?” question in the pretrial context, see 
Schnacke, supra note 148, at 110-14. 
183. See Selbst, supra note 3, at 131-33 (characterizing this task as “deﬁn[ing] the problem” for 
prediction); Schnacke, supra note 148, at 110-14. 
184. Mayson, supra note 6, at 562. 
185. See Clifton et al., supra note 136. 
186. As Andrew Selbst notes in his discussion of predictive policing, “Using data mining also tends 
to bias organizations toward questions that are easier for computers to understand.” Selbst, 
supra note 3, at 132. 
187. Development and Validation of the Proposed Risk Assessment Scales, PA. COMMISSION ON SENT’G 
2-3 (May 2018), https://www.hominid.psu.edu/specialty_programs/pacs/publications-and 
-research/risk-assessment/phase-iii-reports/development-and-validation-of-the-risk 
-assessment-scale [https://perma.cc/7V7V-Z4UW] (“The sentence risk assessment score or 
category is not intended to be used by the court as an aggravating or mitigating factor.”). The 
Commission postponed adoption of the risk assessment instrument and revised the risk scales 
based on a June 2018 public hearing. Revisions to the Proposed Risk Assessment Instrument, PA. 
COMMISSION ON SENT’G (Nov. 2018), https://pcs.la.psu.edu/guidelines/proposed-risk 
-assessment-instrument/additional-information-about-the-proposed-sentence-risk 
-assessment-instrument/revisions-to-the-proposed-risk-assessment-instrument-november 
-2018 [https://perma.cc/PMR9-EFY2]. 
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rates track the incidence of reported crimes by race.
188
 For example, if white com-
munities report domestic violence with less frequency when it happens, violent-
crime reports would embed racial skew relative to the actual rates of offending, 
and arrest rates that track report rates would carry the distortion forward. 
Stated in more general terms, one might object that we can never be conﬁdent 
that our target variable is free from racial distortion.
189
 We must rely on the past 
to predict the future, but we see the past only hazily through the splintered lens 
of data.
190
 We can never know how faithfully the data represent past reality be-
cause we have no direct access to past reality. 
This is a profound objection, and it applies to more than algorithmic meth-
ods. It is an objection to prediction itself. All prediction presumes that we can 
read the past with enough reliability to make useful projections about the future. 
Perhaps in some contexts we cannot. Maybe our past-crime data are inadequate 
to serve as the basis for any prediction.
191
 Or maybe the answer varies by crime 
category. But if this is the case, the answer is not to make the data reﬂect the past 
as we wish it had been. That merely distorts the mirror so that it neither reﬂects 
the data nor any demonstrable reality. The answer is simpler. If past data do not 
reliably represent the events we want to avoid, we should stop consulting them 
as a guide for the future. 
2. Equalizing Outputs in the Case of Differential Offending Rates 
There are also problems with looking to algorithmic affirmative action to 
rectify predictive disparities that ﬂow from differences in underlying rates of 
crime commission across racial lines. Calls to equalize false-positive and false-
negative rates (the disparities that ProPublica identiﬁed) serve as a useful case 
study. There is a practical argument against such interventions and a deeper con-
ceptual one. 
 
188. The correspondence between arrest rates and crime-report rates by race is one fact that schol-
ars sometimes cite as evidence that arrest rates lack racial skew vis-à-vis offending rates. See, 
e.g., Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 38, at 690. 
189. As Selbst puts it, “[I]t may be impossible to tell when the disparate impact truly reﬂects real-
ity.” Selbst, supra note 3, at 167; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 3, at 682 (“So long as 
prior decisions affected by some form of prejudice serve as examples of correctly rendered de-
terminations, data mining will necessarily infer rules that exhibit the same prejudice.”). 
190. Cf. 1 Corinthians 13:12 (“For now we see through a glass, darkly . . . .”). 
191. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 3, at 682-84; Grant T. Harris & Marnie E. Rice, Bayes and Base 
Rates: What Is an Informative Prior for Actuarial Violence Risk Assessment?, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
103, 121 (2013) (“What is not axiomatic is the straightforward application of assumptions 
about priors . . . to violence risk assessment—that remains a set of important empirical mat-
ters.”); Selbst, supra note 3, at 140-43. 
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a. Practical Problems 
The practical argument against intervention to equalize false-positive and 
false-negative rates is that it is unlikely to reduce the net burden of predictive 
regimes on communities of color. To begin with, it may not even be possible to 
equalize both error rates at once. An effort to equalize false-positive rates may 
widen the disparity in false-negative rates, or vice versa. Moreover, even if it is 
possible to equalize both error rates simultaneously, the intervention is likely to 
have a substantial cost in accuracy, which means more incorrect predictions—or 
greater net cost—overall. And this greater net cost may fall disproportionately 
on black communities. 
This might occur because equalizing false-positive and false-negative rates 
does not mean equalizing the total number of errors for each racial group. Equal-
izing false-negative rates, rather, means equalizing the proportion of rearrests the 
algorithm misses for each racial group. If the algorithm misses 50% of rearrests 
for each racial group, and there are more rearrests among black defendants to 
begin with, the algorithm will miss more rearrests of black defendants than of 
white defendants. The difference in the absolute number of false negatives could 
overwhelm any beneﬁt to black communities that ﬂows from equalized false-
positive rates.
192
 The Appendix below illustrates this possibility with an example 
drawn from real data. 
Increased error might disproportionately burden communities of color also 
because people of color might be overrepresented in the system. Even if the total 
error rate is lower for black defendants than white defendants, a lower total error 
rate can translate into a much greater absolute number of errors if there are more 
black defendants in the system. The Appendix illustrates this possibility as well. 
This is to say not that equalizing error rates will necessarily increase the net 
cost of prediction borne by black communities, but that it might. It depends on 
the underlying base rates and what the false-positive and false-negative rates are. 
There is no basis to think that this metric is systematically more likely than any 
other to equalize the net burden of prediction. Moreover, if prioritizing equality 
in error rates has too great a cost in accuracy, it will eliminate the utility of pre-
diction.
193
 
 
192. Equalizing false-positive rates will result in fewer false positives (“law abiders” mistakenly 
forecast for rearrest) for the high-base-rate group than the low-base-rate group because there 
are fewer “law abiders” in the high-base-rate group in the ﬁrst place. 
193. Sam Corbett-Davies and colleagues, analyzing the same Broward County data that ProPublica 
did, found that achieving parity in false-positive rates while still optimizing for public safety 
(and without detaining additional defendants) would result in a 7% increase in violent crime. 
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These practical arguments extend to algorithmic affirmative action to achieve 
statistical parity. Statistical parity requires that, for each racial group subject to 
assessment, the same proportion of the group must be classiﬁed as high-risk. 
That will produce a lower false-positive rate for the high-base-rate group than 
the low-base-rate group. But it will produce a higher false-negative rate for the 
high-base-rate group and more false negatives for every false positive (that is, 
the cost ratio of false positives to false negatives will be low).
194
 Depending on 
the error rates and the relative sizes of the black and white groups assessed, this 
could result in greater net costs for black communities. The same is true for ef-
forts to equalize cost ratios for each racial group. In a recent study by Richard 
Berk, constraining an algorithm to equalize cost ratios increased the disparity in 
the rate of adverse predictions for each racial group, as well as the disparity in 
false-positive rates.
195
 
The point here is straightforward. The goal of algorithmic affirmative action 
is to reduce the net burden of crime-prediction errors on black communities, but 
it is not likely to do so. If there is a difference in the base rate of the relevant crime 
across racial lines, distorting the statistical mirror to ignore that difference will 
just produce disparate rates of error, which might increase the net burden on the 
very communities the intervention was intended to protect. 
b. Conceptual Problems 
The fact that algorithmic affirmative action’s cost in accuracy might out-
weigh its beneﬁts suggests a deeper argument against it: algorithmic affirmative 
action, in essence, constitutes a rejection of actuarial risk assessment itself. 
 
Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 75, at 802. Furthermore, 17% of those detained would be low-
risk people for whom detention was unwarranted. Id. 
194. In Richard Berk’s recent study of juvenile data, for instance, altering the algorithm to achieve 
statistical parity resulted in a lower false-positive rate for the black subset than the white (4% 
versus 9%) but a higher false-negative rate (50% versus 40%). Berk, supra note 103, at 189. In 
addition, Berk found that for whites, the algorithm produced 5.25 false positives for every false 
negative; whereas for blacks, the algorithm produced 1.85 false negatives for every false posi-
tive. Id. 
195. When Berk trained the algorithm only to optimize for overall accuracy, it forecasted rearrest 
for 17% of the white subgroup and 33% of the black subgroup (a 16 percentage-point differ-
ence); the false-positive rates were 16% for the white subgroup and 28% for the black sub-
group (a 12 percentage-point difference). Id. at 180. When he altered it to equalize the cost 
ratios, it forecasted rearrest for 10% of the white subgroup and 29% of the black subgroup (a 
19 percentage-point difference); the false-positive rates were 8% for the white subgroup and 
22% for the black subgroup (a 14 percentage-point difference). Id. at 185. 
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This argument begins with the nature of equality. Equality is a formal con-
cept. Although not all legal theorists agree that it is an “empty” one,
196
 there is 
widespread agreement that any equality demand—any mandate to treat like 
cases alike—will necessitate some substantive judgment about what makes two 
cases relevantly “alike” for purposes of the action at hand.
197
 Antidiscrimination 
laws, for instance, frequently require a claimant to show that she was treated 
differently from a “similarly situated” person outside the protected class in order 
to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.
198
 To analyze such claims, 
judges must decide which traits are relevant for comparing one person to an-
other. For purposes of a hiring decision, for example, skill and work experience 
are probably relevant. Two people with equal skill and experience are therefore 
“similarly situated,” and differential treatment of those two people might raise 
an inference of discrimination. But a person’s favorite ice cream ﬂavor is likely 
not relevant. The fact that an employer treats two people differently despite their 
shared preference for mint chocolate chip does not signal any wrongdoing. 
The question of what makes two people (or groups) relevantly “alike” for 
purposes of a particular action is really a question about the permissible grounds 
for that action. To judge that two people with equivalent skill and experience are 
relevantly “alike” for purposes of a hiring decision is to judge that skill and ex-
perience are good grounds on which to make such a decision. Likewise, to judge 
that two people are relevantly “alike” for purposes of a mortgage if they have 
equal credit scores is to judge that a credit score is a good basis for mortgage 
lending. Every judgment about what constitutes unjustiﬁed inequality in some 
 
196. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982) (“Equality is an 
empty vessel with no substantive moral content of its own.”). 
197. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 159 (Joseph Raz & Penelope A. Bulloch eds., 3d 
ed. 2012) (“[A]ny set of human beings will resemble each other in some respects and differ 
from each other in others and, until it is established what resemblance and differences are 
relevant, ‘Treat like cases alike’ must remain an empty form.”); SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 
203 (“It is now widely accepted that Aristotle’s prescription to treat like cases alike is essen-
tially tautological, or, as Peter Westen puts it, empty.”). 
198. E.g., Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) (“McDonnell Douglas 
teaches that it is the plaintiff’s task to demonstrate that similarly situated employees were not 
treated equally.”); Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing that she was a qual-
iﬁed member of a protected class and was subjected to an adverse employment action in con-
trast with similarly situated employees outside the protected class.”). 
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decision-making process is also a determination about what constitutes legiti-
mate grounds for that decision, and one cannot identify unjustiﬁed inequality 
without choosing, or assuming, some answer to that underlying question.
199
 
To pursue equality in statistical risk assessment, it is necessary to specify the 
appropriate grounds for a risk score, and thus what renders two individuals rel-
evantly alike such that they should receive the same score. But this is not really 
up for debate. The very concept of risk assessment presumes an answer: statis-
tical risk is the appropriate basis for statistical risk assessment. Risk assessment 
is nothing other than a statement of statistical risk. Two people are therefore alike 
for purposes of statistical risk assessment if they present the same statistical risk. 
This is the conception of equality that Section I.C described as a “single-thresh-
old rule.” 
Because it follows from the nature of the activity, a single-threshold rule is a 
sine qua non of risk assessment. If a risk-assessment algorithm, when faced with 
two people who pose precisely the same statistical risk, says “high risk” in one 
case and “low risk” in another, then the algorithm is failing in the most basic 
way. Its determinations of risk cannot be meaningful, for they do not reliably 
state the underlying risk. Whether a given degree of risk is high or low may re-
quire a normative judgment, but it cannot coherently be both. This is to say that 
a single-threshold rule is a corollary of the very concept of statistical prediction. 
A demand for equality in false-positive or false-negative rates corresponds to 
a different judgment about what renders people relevantly alike. Equality in 
false-positive rates demands an equal error rate for two groups: black versus 
white defendants who will not actually go on to commit crime—the eventual law 
abiders. Equality in false-negative rates demands equality between the black and 
white groups who will go on to commit crime—the eventual lawbreakers. Im-
plicit in this equality demand is the judgment that two people or groups are rel-
evantly alike if they have the same eventual outcome. Eventual law abiders 
should be treated the same regardless of race. So should eventual lawbreakers. 
At ﬁrst blush, this makes sense. It seems fairer to condition treatment on 
actual events than on mere probabilities. And if the thing we aspire to predict 
 
199. To appreciate this fact in the context of criminal justice risk assessment, notice that the schema 
of equality metrics laid out in Section I.C is incomplete. It is possible to create new metrics of 
equality by subdividing the ones enumerated there. Rather than inquiring about the percent-
age of black versus white arrestees who are classiﬁed as high risk (total population impact), 
for instance, one might inquire about the percentage of black versus white male arrestees so 
classiﬁed, or the percentage of black versus white male arrestees under twenty-ﬁve who re-
ceive that designation, or the percentage of black versus white male arrestees under twenty-
ﬁve with a prior felony conviction who do. In fact, there is a nearly inﬁnite number of possible 
equality metrics. That is because the key question for deﬁning a metric—what are the relevant 
comparators?—admits of a nearly inﬁnite number of answers. And those one deems to be the 
relevant comparators depend on what one believes to be a legitimate basis for assigning risk. 
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and prevent is crime, surely the actual occurrence of crime must be the best pos-
sible measure of risk! 
In fact, this view is deeply incoherent. To hold that ultimate outcomes are 
what render two people (or groups) alike for purposes of risk assessment is to 
hold that outcomes are a good basis for risk assessment. But they cannot be the 
basis for risk assessment because at the time of assessment they are unknown. 
This is why we resort to risk assessment in the ﬁrst place. Even this formulation, 
moreover, affords outcomes more stability than they have, for not only are out-
comes unknown, but if chance plays any role in our lives, they are also unknow-
able. The point is not a technical one—risk-assessment algorithms can be engi-
neered to produce equal false-positive or false-negative rates across racial 
groups. The point is conceptual. The demand for equal algorithmic treatment 
for same-outcome groups amounts to a judgment that outcomes are the appro-
priate basis for prediction. And that judgment is nonsensical.
200
 
More concretely, structuring an algorithm to equalize false-positive and 
false-negative rates will almost certainly violate the principle that people who 
present the same risk should receive the same risk score (a single-threshold rule). 
If the base rate of the predicted event differs across racial groups, equalizing 
false-positive and false-negative rates will likely require setting different risk 
thresholds by race for each risk classiﬁcation. It might require, for instance, clas-
sifying white defendants as high risk at a rearrest probability of 15% or above, 
while classifying black defendants as high risk only at a probability of 25% or 
higher. In a scenario like that, a person with a 20% chance of rearrest will be 
classiﬁed as high risk if he is white but not if he is black. To achieve equality 
across groups that have not yet come into existence (same-outcome groups), the 
algorithm must produce different risk assessments for people who pose the same 
degree of risk. 
It is worth recalling, too, that the very notion of “error” in risk assessment is 
contested.
201
 False positives are the group of people of whom we can say in ret-
rospect that they committed no harm. But at the point of assessment we do not 
know for whom this will be true. All we have is a probability. And even in retro-
spect, the fact that a risk does not materialize does not mean that a high-risk 
classiﬁcation was incorrect. Sometimes high risks do not materialize. That is 
what differentiates risks from certainties. 
 
200. See Huq, supra note 14, at 1119-22. Keep in mind, too, that short of perfect prediction it is not 
possible for an algorithm to treat every two individuals who will ultimately have the same 
outcome identically. What conditional procedure accuracy equality demands is equality across 
groups: black versus white eventual law abiders and white versus black eventual lawbreakers. 
See sources cited supra note 96. 
201. See supra text accompanying note 83. 
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In sum, to demand equality for same-outcome groups at the cost of equality 
for same-risk individuals is to reject the project of statistical risk assessment. It 
precludes risk assessment on the basis of risk and conditions it on future out-
comes shaped, in part, by chance. 
A similar argument applies to statistical parity. Statistical parity requires that 
the same proportion of each racial group (of people subject to assessment) be 
classiﬁed as high risk. It presumes that the most relevantly “alike” units are the 
entire racial groups subject to assessment, such that these groups should be 
treated alike regardless of statistical differences between them. It thus rejects the 
premise of risk assessment—statistically informed action.
202
 
Having read this far, some readers might conclude that this line of argument 
offers a case in favor of algorithmic affirmative action rather than against it. Yes, 
equalizing error rates or requiring statistical parity does fundamentally compro-
mise statistical crime prediction. And that, some may feel, is a good thing. 
Perhaps these critics are right, and the criminal justice system should get out 
of the business of crime prediction altogether. There are many grounds on which 
one might reach that conclusion.
203
 The merits of those arguments are beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
But this is the debate we should be having. If we want to reject criminal jus-
tice risk assessment, the rejection should be considered and direct, not accom-
plished obliquely, and perhaps inadvertently, through an equality mandate. Risk 
assessment constrained to produce equal false-positive and false-negative rates 
is not really risk assessment. It is race-speciﬁc risk sorting. To undertake that 
activity under the guise of risk assessment has the potential to do more harm 
 
202. It is worth noting here that predictive parity (calibration) too can be inconsistent with a sin-
gle-threshold rule. At the very least, it does not guarantee or necessarily indicate a single 
threshold for risk classiﬁcation. See infra notes 271-272 and accompanying text. 
203. Bernard Harcourt, for instance, argues that (1) predictive crime control efforts might do more 
harm than good; (2) they might produce a “ratchet effect” in which the disparate impact of 
prediction on black communities compounds over time; and (3) the technical allure of pre-
diction can distort and displace moral conceptions of justice. See HARCOURT, supra note 5; see 
also Danielle Ensign et al., Runaway Feedback Loops in Predictive Policing, 81 PROC. MACHINE 
LEARNING RES. 1 (2018); Lum & Isaac, supra note 128, at 19; Starr, supra note 30, at 804-06 
(suggesting that risk assessment during sentencing may distort justice). In addition to these 
arguments, one might contend that, because any present racial disparity in crime risk is the 
product of historical oppression, it is an inappropriate basis for coercive state action—that, in 
other words, it is unjust for the state to condition coercion on crime risk that our society has 
unjustly produced. Alternately, one might believe that the data are simply wrong and that the 
risk at issue is really uniform across racial lines. Finally, and most profoundly, one might be-
lieve that crime risk is an incoherent concept, because all people who are self-determining 
agents have an equal capacity to avoid wrongdoing. 
bias in, bias out 
2277 
than good. It may actually increase the burden on communities of color, as de-
tailed above. And it might foster deep resentment. It would be better to engage 
in a frank debate about whether the disparate racial impact of crime prediction 
outweighs its beneﬁts. 
C. Rejecting Algorithmic Methods 
The third and increasingly most prevalent strategy for promoting racial eq-
uity in prediction is to resist the use of algorithmic methods altogether. In Au-
gust 2018, more than one hundred civil rights organizations released a joint 
statement of concerns with pretrial risk assessment. It began: “We believe that 
jurisdictions should not use risk assessment instruments in pretrial deci-
sionmaking.”
204
 In Pennsylvania, grassroots advocacy groups have effectively 
halted the development of a risk-assessment tool for sentencing, notwithstand-
ing a state law requiring the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing to create 
and implement one.
205
 Recent advocacy materials urged constituents to “[s]ay 
NO to [the] racist risk assessment tool,” on the ground that the tool was “rooted 
in the racial disparities already plaguing Pennsylvania’s criminal justice system,” 
and “[i]n no circumstance should people’s fate within the criminal legal system 
be determined by an algorithm.”
206
 
The trouble with this strategy is that the default alternative—subjective risk 
assessment—is very likely to be worse. Judges engaging in subjective prediction 
assess the risk of the same events as do algorithmic tools, usually future arrest. 
They tend to rely on the same factors as actuarial prediction, with the same ef-
fect. Any consideration of criminal history, for instance, will entail racial inequal-
ity, whether the consideration is actuarial or subjective.
207
 On top of this, sub-
jective risk assessment is plagued by a set of pathologies that motivated the turn 
 
204. Use of Pretrial “Risk Assessment” Instruments, supra note 42. 
205. Samantha Melamed, Pa. Officials Spent 8 Years Developing an Algorithm for Sentencing. Now, 
Lawmakers Want to Scrap It., PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.philly.com/news
/risk-assessment-sentencing-pennsylvania--20181212.html [https://perma.cc/4XL7-ED77]. 
206. Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing: Say NO to Racist Risk Assessment Tool, COLOR CHANGE, 
https://act.colorofchange.org/letter/pa_no_risk_assessment_email_action [https://perma
.cc/9GSD-QG6Y]. 
207. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.07(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2016) (noting 
“the danger that the use of criminal-history provisions to increase the severity of sentences 
may have disparate impacts on racial or ethnic minorities, or other disadvantaged groups”); 
id. § 6B.07(4) (instructing sentencing commissions to “monitor the effects of . . . incorporat-
ing offenders’ criminal history as a factor relevant to sentencing,” giving “particular attention” 
to whether it “contributes to punishment disparities among racial and ethnic minorities, or 
other disadvantaged groups”); id. § 6B.07 cmt. (“An accumulating body of research indicates 
the yale law journal 128:2218  2019 
2278 
to actuarial tools in the ﬁrst place. Subjective prediction is vulnerable to irrational 
bias. A 2016 metareview of risk-assessment instruments used in parole and pro-
bation contexts in the United States concluded that “[t]here is overwhelming 
evidence that risk assessments completed using structured approaches produce 
estimates that are more reliable and more accurate than unstructured risk assess-
ments.”
208
 Other recent studies have reached similar conclusions.
209
 This is be-
cause individual judges may generalize to a greater extent, and with less ground-
ing, than statistical models do.
210
 Human beings are prone to cognitive biases 
that distort rational judgment.
211
 In the context of risk assessment, judges may 
overweight factors that have particular salience to them (including the current 
charged offense), fall victim to framing effects, and give undue signiﬁcance to 
their own past experience.
212
 
Irrational cognitive bias can fuel racial inequality in subjective prediction. In-
dividual criminal justice actors tasked with subjective risk assessment may har-
bor animosity toward one racial group that infects their decision-making. Or the 
bias may be implicit. A signiﬁcant and growing body of experimental literature 
 
that criminal-history formulas in sentencing guidelines are responsible for much of 
the . . . disparities in black and white incarceration rates . . . .”); id. (noting that African Amer-
ican defendants appear in criminal courtrooms, on average, with larger numbers of past con-
victions than white defendants and citing relevant research). 
208. Sarah L. Desmarais et al., Performance of Recidivism Risk Assessment Instruments in U.S. Correc-
tional Settings, 13 PSYCHOL. SERVICES 206, 206 (2016). 
209. See, e.g., Ben Green & Yiling Chen, Disparate Interactions: An Algorithm-in-the-Loop An-
alysis of Fairness in Risk Assessments (2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholar 
.harvard.edu/ﬁles/19-fat.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8QA-AHHL] (presenting the results of an 
experimental study in which human subjects “underperformed the risk assessment even when 
presented with its predictions”); Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 43, at 34-35 (describing 
recent studies suggesting that actuarial risk assessment can improve accuracy of pretrial risk 
judgments). 
210. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 30, at 284-85 (“[I]f constitutionally or ethically suspect varia-
bles are excised [from risk-assessment tools], it is likely that fact-ﬁnders would consider 
[them] informally anyway, rendering their use less reliable, transparent, and consistent.”); 
Starr, supra note 30, at 824 (“There is, to be sure, considerable statistical research suggesting 
that judges (and prosecutors) do on average treat female defendants more leniently than male 
defendants.”). 
211. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et 
al. eds., 1982) (reviewing multiple studies on human biases across various judgmental heu-
ristics). 
212. See Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Biases, SOC. RES. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3300171 (noting that empirical research on the accuracy of machine versus human 
predictions suggests the existence of a “current offense bias” that distorts judicial assess-
ments). 
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has documented the effects of implicit bias in a range of criminal justice set-
tings.
213
 There is no reason to think subjective risk assessment is immune. On 
the contrary, ample and mounting evidence has documented otherwise inexpli-
cable racial disparities in policing, charging, pretrial detention, and sentenc-
ing.
214
 Notably, two recent studies of risk assessment in action have argued that 
it was the exercise of human discretion in responding to risk-assessment scores 
that injected racial disparity in outcomes, rather than the risk-assessment scores 
themselves.
215
 
Lastly, subjective risk assessment is far more opaque, and far less accounta-
ble, than algorithmic assessment.
216
 The human being who judges a person to 
be a good risk or a bad one may not herself understand why she has done so.
217
 
Most risk-assessment algorithms, by contrast, can be examined and interro-
gated; the trend is away from proprietary algorithms and toward transpar-
ency.
218
 It is therefore possible to hold algorithms accountable for their calcula-
tions and outputs in a way that it is not possible to hold humans accountable for 
their mental deliberations.
219
 We can also quantify an algorithm’s racial impact 
 
213. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (2006); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived 
Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383 
(2006); David L. Faigman et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012); 
Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremember-
ing, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007); Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Bias: The Guilty/Not 
Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187 (2010); L. Song Richardson & Phillip 
Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013). 
214. E.g., Eckhouse et al., supra note 179, at 202 (“[T]here is substantial evidence that defendants 
of color are disadvantaged in pretrial and sentencing decisions made without reference to risk-
assessment models.”); M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal 
Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1323 (2014) (ﬁnding that black defendants in the federal sys-
tem were 1.75 times more likely to face a mandatory minimum charge than similarly situated 
white defendants); supra notes 127-130 (sources reporting and discussing racial disparity in 
policing actions not explicable by crime rates alone). 
215. Green & Chen, supra note 209; Stevenson, supra note 6, at 53; cf. Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing 
Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 454 (2016) (arguing that “actuarial instruments should limit” 
rather than inform judicial discretion). 
216. See Kroll et al., supra note 25. 
217. For reviews and discussions of research on unconscious biases, see Ralph Richard Banks & 
Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Ine-
quality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2009); John A. Bargh, Unconscious Thought Theory and Its Discon-
tents: A Critique of the Critiques, 29 SOC. COGNITION 629 (2011); and Martie G. Haselton et al., 
Adaptive Rationality: An Evolutionary Perspective on Cognitive Bias, 27 SOC. COGNITION 733 
(2009). 
218. See Kroll et al., supra note 25. 
219. See, e.g., id. 
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and demand that its predictions fulﬁll whatever measure of output equality we 
choose. Scholars and stakeholders have begun to elaborate the procedural and 
legal regimes necessary for this kind of accountability.
220
 There are hurdles, but 
the accountability prospects are far better for algorithmic prediction than for 
subjective prediction. 
At least on paper, then, algorithms have distinct advantages over subjective 
assessments of risk. They eliminate the variability, indeterminacy, and apparent 
randomness—indeed, the subjectivity—of human prediction that has long per-
vaded criminal justice. They bring uniformity, transparency, and accountability 
to the task. 
This is not to overstate the case for algorithms. The evidence for the superior 
accuracy of actuarial over subjective prediction is not watertight; a great deal de-
pends on the algorithm at issue and the details of its use.
221
 There is an urgent 
need for further research to document the comparative effects of the two meth-
ods on the ground.
222
 It is also true that there are concerns unique to algorithmic 
methods. Algorithmic assessment carries a scientiﬁc aura, which can produce 
unwarranted deference or a mistaken impression of objectivity.
223
 Some algo-
rithms are opaque. Algorithmic systems may be vulnerable to entrenchment be-
cause they require specialized skill and resources to alter. Finally, if algorithmic 
assessment operates on a much larger scale than subjective assessment does, it 
 
220. See id. at 680-82; Selbst, supra note 3, at 110, 169-80 (proposing “algorithmic impact state-
ments” that “would require police departments to evaluate the efficacy and potential discrim-
inatory effects of all available choices for predictive policing technologies”); Sarah Holland et 
al., The Dataset Nutrition Label: A Framework to Drive Higher Quality Standards (May 
2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.03677.pdf [https://perma.cc
/FC79-BQX5] (proposing that data sets be required to include the equivalent of “nutrition 
labels” that disclose possible demographic skews or systemic inaccuracies in the data); Dillon 
Reisman et al., Algorithmic Impact Assessments, AI NOW INST. (Apr. 2018), https://
ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6PV-GRJQ]. 
221. A thoughtful judge with broad experience may be more effective at assessing risk than a rudi-
mentary algorithm, but a sophisticated algorithm may be more effective than a bad judge; 
and a good judge operating with the beneﬁt of a good algorithm may be most effective of all. 
See Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting Recidivism, 4 
SCI. ADVANCES 1 (2018) (ﬁnding that untrained human participants performed nearly as well 
as COMPAS); Green & Chen, supra note 209; Starr, supra note 30, at 855 (concluding that 
“the shibboleth that actuarial prediction outperforms clinical prediction is—like the actuarial 
risk predictions themselves—a generalization that is not true in every case”); Stevenson, supra 
note 6, at 14-19 (surveying existing evidence). 
222. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 6, at 57-58. 
223. On the normative judgments that the construction of a risk-assessment algorithm entails, see 
generally Eaglin, supra note 30. 
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can also inﬂict damage on a much larger scale.
224
 And of course, if algorithmic 
assessment is imposed on top of subjective risk assessment, it is likely to com-
pound the racially disparate effects of both forms of assessment. 
Still, given the state of practice and the state of our knowledge, there is every 
reason to expect that subjective risk assessment produces greater racial disparity 
than algorithmic risk assessment—and that it does so with less transparency and 
less potential for accountability or intervention. To the extent that this is true, 
rejecting algorithmic methods in favor of subjective risk assessment not only will 
fail to eliminate predictive inequality, but also might exacerbate it. At best, then, 
rejection of actuarial risk assessment is a superﬁcial measure. At worst, cam-
paigning against algorithms per se might distract from the real problem: the na-
ture of prediction itself. Not only will subjective prediction continue to generate 
racial disparity, but in the absence of algorithmic methods, the disparity will be 
harder to see and to redress. 
Actuarial risk assessment, in other words, has not created the problem of ra-
cially disparate prediction, but rather exposed it. Its contribution is to illumi-
nate—in formal, quantitative terms—the way in which prediction replicates and 
magniﬁes inequality in the world. More than thirty years ago, Noval Morris and 
Marc Miller, arguing for a frank reckoning with the costs and beneﬁts of preven-
tive detention, wrote: “We propose to get the dragon out onto the plain.”
225
 Al-
gorithmic prediction puts the dragon of predictive inequality out on the plain. It 
is frightful, but at least we can see it. Rejecting the precise mirror of algorithmic 
prediction in favor of subjective risk assessment does not solve the problem. It 
merely turns a blind eye. 
iv.  rethinking risk 
The predictive inequality exposed by algorithmic methods should cause us 
to rethink a central strategy in contemporary U.S. criminal justice: identiﬁcation 
and coercive control of the “dangerous.” What algorithmic prediction makes 
painfully explicit are the racial fault lines in the risk-management model that has 
come to dominate criminal justice. In 1992, Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon 
diagnosed the “New Penology,” a shift in the orientation of the American crimi-
nal justice system.
226
 Under the “Old Penology,” the system’s primary goal and 
 
224. See generally O’NEIL, supra note 3 (chronicling and illustrating the dangers of ostensible sci-
entiﬁc objectivity, opacity, entrenchment, and scale). 
225. Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2 (1985). 
226. Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of 
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452, 455 (1992). 
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responsibility was the adjudication of guilt for speciﬁc criminal acts. The New 
Penology, by contrast, sees the system’s primary goal and responsibility as the 
management of “dangerous groups.”
227
 Many others have since expanded on 
this diagnosis.
228
 Scholars have long argued that a criminal justice system de-
signed to incapacitate the risky will perpetuate racial injustice. Actuarial analytics 
illustrate precisely how. 
There are two possible responses to the problem. The ﬁrst is to refute the 
signiﬁcance of risk itself, lament the New Penology, and argue for a return to the 
Old.
229
 Regardless of whether such a return is preferable, it is very unlikely to 
occur. The other option is to accept the signiﬁcance of risk and prediction in 
criminal justice decision-making, but to radically rethink its role. This Part ar-
gues for the latter approach. It further contends that actuarial risk assessment 
can—and should—play a central role in changing how the criminal justice sys-
tem understands and responds to risk. 
A. Risk as the Product of Structural Forces 
As a mirror of the past, actuarial risk assessment provides a detailed image 
of the societal distribution of crimes and arrests. To the extent that that image is 
a picture of race and class disparity, the reason is not mysterious. Aggregate 
crime and arrest risk of the kind that contemporary criminal justice risk-assess-
ment tools measure—“any arrest” or arrest for a “violent crime”—are functions 
of disadvantage. 
This fact can be lost in individual cases. When a judge confronts a statisti-
cally risky person, the risk can seem like a feature of the person himself, some-
thing for which he can or should be held responsible. Perhaps this is especially 
 
227. Id. at 456. 
228. See, e.g., Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial Pre-
vention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327 (2014); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 
(2015); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
611 (2014); Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 301, 348 (2015); Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1405-06 
(2008); Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 771, 774 (1998) (describing the constellation of government efforts to incapacitate 
the dangerous as “[t]he preventive state”). 
229. E.g., Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 107 (2018) (arguing that actuarial risk-
informed sentencing “distorts traditional sentencing principles, by authorizing and encour-
aging the consideration of non-culpable and personal characteristics to predict future behav-
ior”); cf. HARCOURT, supra note 5 (arguing “against prediction” and for randomization as a 
guiding principle of law enforcement action). 
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likely when judges are forced to assess risk and blame at the same time, as they 
are at sentencing.
230
 
But judgments of risk are fundamentally different from judgments of 
blame.
231
 Blame is a moral quality; a judgment of blame is a judgment about the 
moral responsibility a person bears for past choices he has freely made. Risk is 
an empirical quality, not a moral one. A judgment of risk has no inherent moral 
import; it is a factual judgment about the likelihood of a given future event. The 
moral import of the factors that render a person risky is irrelevant to the assess-
ment of risk itself. A victim of circumstances may be as risky as a ruthless ma-
nipulator. 
Judgments of risk therefore have a very different relationship to punishment 
than do judgments of blame.
232
 The distinguishing features of punishment are 
the expression of moral condemnation and the purposeful inﬂiction of suffer-
ing.
233
 A judgment of condemnation is thus a necessary condition for imposing 
punishment.
234
 Blame can authorize punishment, and punishment can be an ap-
 
230. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Jus-
tice, 14 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1444 (2001) (arguing for a full institutional separation of punish-
ment and prevention); see also Mayson, supra note 228 (arguing for a conceptual, if not insti-
tutional, separation). 
231. See Mayson, supra note 228, at 324-27 (elaborating differences between judgments of risk and 
blame). 
232. Id. at 317-33 (contrasting concepts of punishment and preventive restraint and exploring the 
implications of the contrast in legal doctrine and practice). 
233. Notwithstanding the many points of dispute in punishment theory, there is broad consensus 
on this fact. See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION 95 (2008) (deﬁning punish-
ment as “the intentional inﬂiction of a stigmatizing deprivation”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) (“What distinguishes 
a criminal from a civil sanction . . . is the judgment of community condemnation which ac-
companies and justiﬁes its imposition.”). 
234. E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (“[A] society that values the good name and 
freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there 
is reasonable doubt about his guilt.”); Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism: The Consensus 
Model of Criminal Punishment, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 143, 144 (Michael Tonry ed., 
2004) (noting “substantial agreement” among theorists and practitioners that “concepts of 
just deserts must place limits on the pursuit of crime control and other consequentialist goals” 
through punishment); Mayson, supra note 228, at 317-21, 327-29 (enumerating criminal-law 
doctrines that tie punishment to culpability); cf. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in PUN-
ISHMENT 58, 62 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 1975) (coining the term “telishment” for 
hypothetical sanctions not conditioned on culpability, and arguing that “punishment” is lim-
ited, by deﬁnition, to sanctions for a blameworthy act). Whether a judgment of blame is a 
sufficient condition for punishment is another matter. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Lifting the 
Cloak: Preventive Detention as Punishment, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1173, 1201 (2011) (“Sensitivity 
to the drawbacks of punishment undermines the thesis that desert suffices to justify penal 
sanctions.”). 
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propriate response to a judgment of blame. Risk, on the other hand, cannot au-
thorize punishment on its own: an empirical assessment cannot authorize a 
moral response. Nor can punishment be an appropriate response to an empirical 
fact. 
Actuarial risk assessment may help to clarify the difference between judg-
ments of risk and judgments of blame because, in the aggregate, big data and 
statistical analysis continually demonstrate that both arrests and some categories 
of crimes are concentrated in marginalized communities. This is to say that arrest 
and crime risk are products of structural forces. They are functions of disad-
vantage. Recognition of this fact has two corollaries: (1) predictive algorithms 
can be deployed “in reverse” to help diagnose areas of risk and need; and (2) one 
means of reducing risk is to target the structural conditions that produce it. The 
rest of this Part argues for these two approaches. 
B. Algorithmic Prediction as Diagnostic 
Because predictive algorithms transparently reﬂect inequality in the data 
from which they are built, they can also be deployed in reverse: as diagnostic 
tools to identify sites and causes of racial disparity in criminal justice. To deploy 
algorithms in this way, stakeholders and researchers must ﬁrst audit an algo-
rithm’s predictions for racial disparity. If there is such disparity, by any equality 
metric, the next step is to identify why. It will either be the case that (1) the al-
gorithm is less predictive for one group than for another (as was true for His-
panic defendants in Melissa Hamilton’s study of COMPAS); or (2) the algo-
rithm is equally predictive across racial lines and the disparity ﬂows from a 
difference in the base rate of the predicted event (as was true for black versus 
white defendants in the ProPublica study).
235
 
If the algorithm is less predictive for one racial group, stakeholders and re-
searchers should attempt to ﬁgure out why. It may be that the data are more 
limited or of lower quality for one racial group. That conclusion would support 
policy efforts to increase data collection, improve data quality, or adjust the data 
directly to ensure adequate group representation for the development of a re-
vised algorithm. Alternately, the source of the divergence in predictive accuracy 
might be that, for one group, certain input factors correlate differently with the 
relevant outcome. As noted above, some risk-assessment-tool developers have 
found that past arrests and misdemeanor convictions “mean less” about future 
risk for black people than for other demographic groups.
236
 In places where this 
 
235. See supra Section I.B; see also Hamilton, supra note 27. Hamilton evaluated COMPAS’s per-
formance on the basis of the same data set as ProPublica. 
236. Supra notes 163, 171. 
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is true, it suggests that black communities have been disproportionately subject 
to past arrest and misdemeanor prosecution relative to rates of offense. This kind 
of evidence would support policy initiatives to counter overpolicing and overen-
forcement. More generally, identifying group differences in how input factors 
correlate with outcomes can help illuminate group differences in the causal path-
ways that generate crime and arrests.
237
 That information is essential to inform-
ing crime-reduction policy. 
The second possibility is that the algorithm is equally predictive across racial 
lines, and that the racial disparity in outputs ﬂows mathematically from a differ-
ence in the underlying base rate of the predicted event—for instance, in the base 
rate of rearrest. When this is the case, stakeholders should question why the 
base-rate difference exists. Are the data simply less accurate for one racial group 
(that is, are rearrests systematically underreported for one group)? If so, the data 
should be improved. Or are the data accurate, and the problem is that the event 
we have chosen to predict is visited with unjustiﬁed frequency on minority com-
munities, like arrest for low-level crimes? If that is the case, we should rethink 
the value of predicting that outcome at all.
238
 Base-rate differences that reﬂect 
racially skewed enforcement rather than racial variance in crime commission also 
provide a powerful case for changes to policing policy. Lastly, a divergent base 
rate might reﬂect a difference across racial groups that we do want predictions to 
capture, like a difference in offense rates. If the rates for some category of crime 
vary by race in a given time and place, awareness of that fact is critical to mean-
ingful policy intervention. 
To summarize: Instead of discarding the statistical mirror, we could confront 
the image it reﬂects and take responsibility for it. In other arenas, data scientists 
are working to apply machine learning to similar diagnostic ends.
239
 Deploying 
algorithmic prediction as a diagnostic tool would promote racial justice by iden-
tifying sites and causes of racial disparity in criminal justice, paving the way for 
targeted interventions. It would also promote the larger interests of the system 
 
237. Hamilton, supra note 27, at 11, 29 (noting the likelihood that risk-assessment tools will under-
perform for Hispanic Americans unless they integrate cultural and situational factors that 
moderate risk, and concluding that it is “quite likely” that poorer performance of COMPAS 
for Hispanic defendants was due to failure to integrate “cultural differences” that moderate 
risk); see also Stephane M. Shepherd & Roberto Lewis-Fernandez, Forensic Risk Assessment and 
Cultural Diversity: Contemporary Challenges and Future Directions, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
427, 498 (2016). 
238. See supra Section III.B.2. 
239. One group of scientists, for instance, is using machine learning to identify adjectives most 
frequently associated with different ethnic groups over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
to illuminate the history of discrimination. Nikhil Garg et al., Word Embeddings Quantify 100 
Years of Gender and Ethnic Stereotypes, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. E3635 (2018). 
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by troubleshooting data problems and by helping to illuminate the causal path-
ways of crime and arrest risk. 
C. A Supportive Response to Risk 
Recognizing that arrest and crime risk are the product of structural forces 
and directly confronting the statistical image of those patterns should lead us to 
fundamentally reconsider how the criminal justice system responds to risk. In 
the aggregate, these forms of risk are a function of disadvantage. To target the 
risky for restraint is thus to target the disadvantaged for more disadvantage. It 
is to compound the very social conditions that produce crime and arrest risk in 
the ﬁrst place.
240
 
Two foundational points are important to clarify here. First, as discussed 
above, a judgment of risk warrants a different kind of response than a judgment 
of blame. A judgment of risk, by itself, cannot authorize and does not warrant 
punishment. It is a familiar principle in criminal law and theory that punishment 
must be limited to blameworthy past acts.
241
 Punishment is not an appropriate 
response to the possibility of a speculative future act. It may be that, when a per-
son is subject to punishment for a culpable past act, risk is a permissible factor 
to consider in deciding what (deserved) punishment to impose in order to pro-
duce the most beneﬁt.
242
 But risk itself justiﬁes a utilitarian, rather than a puni-
tive, response. A risk assessment is an empirical judgment of the probability of 
some future harm occurring, given status quo conditions. The appropriate re-
sponse is an intervention that minimizes the possibility of a net harm, taking 
into account any harm the intervention itself inﬂicts, and maximizes the possi-
bility of a net beneﬁt. A risk judgment alone provides no justiﬁcation for a re-
sponsive intervention to express condemnation or inﬂict unnecessary suffering. 
The second important point is that there is scant evidence on what interven-
tions “work” to manage crime risk at the individual level. Custodial detention 
incapacitates a person from committing crime outside of the institution during 
 
240. Cf. Deborah Hellman, Indirect Discrimination and the Duty to Avoid Compounding Injustice, in 
FOUNDATIONS OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION LAW 105 (Hugh Collins & Tarunabh Khaitan 
eds., 2018) (arguing that there is a general duty to avoid compounding injustice and that 
widespread belief in such a duty animates disparate impact discrimination law). 
241. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 221-351 (10th ed. 2017) 
(identifying “culpability” as one of “[t]hree foundational principles [that] limit the imposi-
tion of punishment,” and exploring actus reus and mens rea doctrines that strive to limit pun-
ishment to culpable past acts); see also sources cited supra notes 233-234. 
242. See, e.g., Frase, supra note 234 (describing forms of limiting retributivism that would accom-
modate such practice). 
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the period of conﬁnement, but it is very costly (in both ﬁscal and human terms), 
does not prevent crime within the institution, and may have a criminogenic ef-
fect over the long term.
243
 Noncustodial forms of restraint like GPS monitoring 
may deter some crime, but the evidence is weak, and they too impose hefty 
costs.
244
 Robust empirical studies have mostly found that contemporary sex- 
offender registration and monitoring regimes, intended to prevent sex crimes, 
may do more harm than good.
245
 There is simply very little evidence demon-
strating the relative efficacy of different possible individual-scale interventions 
at reducing serious crime. 
These two points suggest a way out of the cycle of compounding disad-
vantage: the default response to risk need not be coercion. What if it were sup-
port instead? Risk, after all, is neither intrinsic nor immutable. It is possible to 
change the odds.
246
 In the short term, a supportive, needs-oriented response to 
risk would mitigate the immediate racial impact of prediction. If a high-risk clas-
siﬁcation meant greater access to support and opportunities, a higher false-pos-
itive rate among black defendants would be less of a concern. In the long term, 
a supportive response to risk might help to counter the social conditions that 
drive crime, for the beneﬁt of all. 
1. Objections 
A skeptical reader may object at the outset that this argument goes too far. 
Crime, in the aggregate, is also the product of structural forces. Does that mean 
no one should be punished for committing one? It cannot be an argument 
 
243. For a recent evaluation and synthesis of credible studies on the effect of incarceration on sub-
sequent offending, see David Roodman, The Impact of Incarceration on Crime, OPEN PHILAN-
THROPY PROJECT (2017), https://www.openphilanthropy.org/ﬁles/Focus_Areas/Criminal
_Justice_Reform/The_impacts_of_incarceration_on_crime_10.pdf [https://perma.cc
/NUQ6-46R5]. See also, e.g., Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. 
L. REV. 1 (2017) (estimating costs of detention); Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Conse-
quences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 759-69 (2017) (ﬁnding, inter 
alia, that pretrial detention increased the likelihood that a defendant would accrue new crim-
inal charges within eighteen months of a bail hearing). 
244. See, e.g., Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 43, at 45-47 (surveying evidence on efficacy of elec-
tronic monitoring and identifying key costs of electronic monitoring). 
245. E.g., J.J. Prescott, Do Sex Offender Registries Make Us Less Safe?, 35 REGULATION 48 (2012). 
246. Cf. Patrick Sharkey et al., Community and the Crime Decline: The Causal Effect of Local Nonproﬁts 
on Violent Crime, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 1214, 1234 (2017) (estimating that “the addition of 10 com-
munity nonproﬁts per 100,000 residents leads to a 9 percent decline in the murder rate, a 6 
percent decline in the violent crime rate, and a 4 percent decline in the property crime rate”). 
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against state coercion that the system compounds disadvantage when it pun-
ishes, for that would preclude law enforcement entirely. 
But this extension of the point does not undercut it. Indeed, the realization 
that criminal prosecution and sentencing systematically burden the already dis-
advantaged, far beyond what is necessary to serve law enforcement goals, has 
galvanized widespread criminal justice reform over the past half decade. Crimi-
nal law and policy should account for the fact that coercive punishment will to 
some extent compound existing disadvantage. This is not an argument against 
all punishment, because punishment has retributive and expressive goals that 
may justify some coercion not otherwise justiﬁed on consequentialist 
grounds.
247
 Risk assessment and management, however, are purely consequen-
tialist endeavors. The questions they pose are empirical: what is the likelihood 
of future harm X under status quo conditions, and what intervention can mini-
mize that risk at least cost to the individuals concerned and to the public? In that 
setting, addressing the underlying sources of risk should be the paramount ob-
jective. 
The skeptical reader may also ﬁnd the idea of supporting high-risk individ-
uals to be dangerously naïve. Some people pose acute threats of serious harm 
that nothing but incapacitation can manage. But a default supportive response 
to risk need not mean obliviousness to danger. As noted above, we know very 
little about what risk-management strategies are most effective in run-of-the-
mill cases. Meaningful support has just as much promise as electronic monitor-
ing. For those who pose an acute threat to an identiﬁable person or group, the 
default could yield. Support for the many does not preclude preventive restraint, 
or even detention, of a few. 
Nor does a supportive response to risk amount to coddling criminals. It does 
not diminish the state’s authority to punish. Risk assessment is designed not to 
determine just punishment, but rather to evaluate risk in order to manage it. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Proposing a supportive response to risk is not original. As a logical matter, it 
is what the “least-restrictive-means” principle already encoded in many risk-
management systems requires. An offer of support is certainly less restrictive 
than monitoring or detention. Pretrial and sentencing laws generally include 
 
247. But see Anders Kaye, Radicalized Risk Assessment, 36 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 610, 611 (2018) (arguing 
that “colonization” of criminal justice by risk assessment will illuminate the structural causes 
of crime to such an extent that it will galvanize a rejection of retributivism). 
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some version of the least-restrictive-means principle.
248
 A supportive response 
to risk is also built into the “risk-needs-responsivity” (RNR) model prevalent in 
more mature systems of crime-risk management.
249
 A related, newer model of 
crime-risk management, the Good Lives Model (GLM), is even more explicit in 
taking a supportive approach. The GLM is “a strengths-based rehabilitation  
theory that aims to equip clients with internal and external resources to live a 
good or better life—a life that is socially acceptable and personally meaning-
ful.”
250
 Whereas the RNR model directs social workers or other practitioners to 
identify and address the risky individual’s “criminogenic needs,” the GLM di-
rects practitioners to identify “internal or external barriers toward living a good 
life,” which can then be “addressed within the broader strengths-based frame-
work.”
251
 
All of these models justify, and arguably require, a default supportive re-
sponse to risk. When a person is identiﬁed as presenting a substantial risk (but 
not so acute that immediate incapacitation is necessary), the core inquiry should 
be: “What can we do to help you succeed at X, such that harm Y does not tran-
spire? What do you need?” It is of no great import whether this approach is 
characterized as pursuing the least-restrictive method of risk management, ad-
dressing criminogenic needs, or dismantling internal and external barriers to a 
better life. The support offered could include assistance in obtaining housing, 
education, training, employment, or counseling; accessing social services; ob-
taining a driver’s license or restoring a suspended one; or pursuing medical, sub-
stance-abuse, or mental-health treatment.
252
 
 
248. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2018) (requiring judges to impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but 
not greater than necessary” to accomplish the goals of punishment); STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE § 10-1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (providing that “[i]n deciding 
pretrial release, the judicial officer should assign the least restrictive condition(s) of release 
that will reasonably ensure a defendant’s attendance at court proceedings and protect the com-
munity, victims, witnesses or any other person”); Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in 
Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363, 364 (1997) (explaining the “parsimony” principle). 
249. See, e.g., Devon L.L. Polaschek, An Appraisal of the Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) Model of 
Offender Rehabilitation and Its Application in Correctional Treatment, 17 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGI-
CAL PSYCHOL. 1 (2012); Corrections in Ontario: Directions for Reform, INDEP. REV. ONT. COR-
RECTIONS 110 (Sept. 2017), https://www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/sites/default/ﬁles/content
/mcscs/docs/Corrections%20in%20Ontario%2C%20Directions%20for%20Reform.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T2ED-SPG5]. 
250. Tony Ward et al., The Good Lives Model and the Risk Needs Responsivity Model: A Critical Re-
sponse to Andrews, Bonta, and Wormith (2011), 39 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 94, 95 (2012). 
251. Id. 
252. Cf. Glenn A. Grant, 2017 Report to the Governor and the Legislature, N.J. CTS. 26 (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2017cjrannual.pdf [https://perma.cc
/YT4W-8EWQ] (“Even when they are not court-ordered to submit to treatment or other 
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More broadly, recognizing that risk is the product of social conditions should 
lead us to seek responses that directly address those conditions—an approach 
Kelly Hannah-Moffat has called a “socio-structural analysis of risk.”
253
 As Tim 
Goddard and Randolph R. Myers have suggested, risk-assessment tools that 
identify geographic areas of high risk, or high-risk demographic groups, could 
justify community-support programs and targeted private or public investments 
in schools, jobs, housing, and economic development.
254
 To the extent that a risk 
proﬁle reﬂects law enforcement practice more than the likelihood of serious 
crime, risk-management measures could include modiﬁcations to law enforce-
ment practice.
255
 One simple structural intervention that would dramatically re-
duce risks of nonappearance and rearrest in the pretrial phase would be to dedi-
cate the resources necessary to adjudicate cases more promptly. 
3. Examples 
A shift toward a default supportive response to risk would certainly present 
a practical challenge. The ascendant policing model known as “focused deter-
rence” offers a cautionary tale. It directs police to focus on a small number of 
people most likely to be involved in violent crime (as either perpetrator or vic-
tim). In concept, the model requires police both to offer a carrot—increased so-
cial support—and to threaten a stick—increased punishment for even small 
criminal infractions—to those targeted. In practice, the carrot tends to get lost.
256
 
Criminal justice system actors, for the most part, are not trained as social work-
ers. A good guy/bad guy mentality pervades the system. Changing the default 
response to risk would require overcoming these institutional and cultural bar-
riers. 
 
services, many defendants on pretrial release request assistance in areas such as mental health 
and drug treatment.”). 
253. Kelly Hannah-Moffat, A Conceptual Kaleidoscope: Contemplating “Dynamic Structural Risk” and 
an Uncoupling of Risk from Need, 22 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 33, 35 (2016). 
254. Tim Goddard & Randolph R. Myers, Against Evidence-Based Oppression: Marginalized Youth 
and the Politics of Risk-Based Assessment and Intervention, 21 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 151, 
162 (2017); see also Sharkey et al., supra note 246, at 1233-36. 
255. Goddard & Myers, supra note 254, at 162; Hannah-Moffat, supra note 253, at 35 (arguing that 
modiﬁcations to criminal justice practices that “produce systemic conditions for recidi-
vism . . . could make a measurable difference in recidivism and other correctional efficien-
cies”). 
256. See, e.g., Selbst, supra note 3, at 142-43 (noting that early evidence on the program’s imple-
mentation in Chicago suggests that the support did not happen). 
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But a shift in the way the system responds to risk is nonetheless achievable. 
There are programs across the nation that have already implemented strategies 
of support as a ﬁrst-line response to risk, and that might offer useful models. 
One such program is Supervision to Aid Reentry (STAR), an unusual 
reentry court operated by Magistrate Judge Rice of the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Judge Restrepo of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
257
 Unlike most existing reentry courts, the pro-
gram targets those designated as risky: it is open only to “returning citi-
zens . . . who pose a medium-to-high risk of recidivism for violent crime,” as assessed 
by the Federal Post-Conviction Risk Assessment Tool.
258
 At each session, the 
participants update the presiding judge on their lives and challenges. The pre-
siding judge listens. He asks how the court can help. 
And help it does. Working collaboratively with federal probation officers, the 
U.S. Attorney’s office, the federal defender, and a team of volunteers, Judges Rice 
and Restrepo strive to eliminate whatever obstacle is impeding smooth reentry. 
The reentry-court team assists participants in securing housing, employment, 
training, counseling, beneﬁts, education, credit, and treatment. One partner or-
ganization helps participants clear their records of old arrests; another employs 
participants in the restoration of abandoned homes. A local university’s psychol-
ogy department has developed an intensive cognitive-behavioral therapy pro-
gram for participants who opt in. Law school clinic students help participants 
navigate the labyrinthine traffic court to handle old ﬁnes, restore suspended li-
censes, and obtain new ones. Perhaps most importantly, the court has created a 
deep sense of community among the participants and the myriad individuals and 
organizations involved in its efforts. The program entails sanctions, too, for fail-
ure to abide by its relatively loose conditions, but the overwhelming emphasis is 
on support. In its eleven years, 9% of the program’s graduates and 15% of all 
participants have been rearrested or had their parole revoked, as compared to 
35.8% for similarly situated individuals not enrolled.
259
 
Other models include the Harlem Parole Reentry Court, which “links parol-
ees to a range of social services, including drug treatment, vocational services, 
and mental health treatment,” and offers the same referrals to family members 
 
257. By way of full disclosure, I volunteered with this program as a law clerk for Judge Restrepo. 
258. Memorandum from L. Felipe Restrepo, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, & 
Timothy R. Rice, Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court for the E. Dist. of Pa., to Lawrence F. 
Stengel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Annual Report: Reentry 
Court Program 1 (July 17, 2018), http://www.fbacrimphila.org/ﬁles/2018-annual-report.doc 
[https://perma.cc/GR4S-QZVM] (emphasis added). 
259. Id. 
the yale law journal 128:2218  2019 
2292 
“[w]here appropriate . . . to help increase stability in the home.”
260
 This kind of 
holistic reentry support appears to be part of a trend.
261
 In the pretrial context, 
there is considerable momentum toward more supportive risk-management ap-
proaches. In Tulsa, Oklahoma, the public defender’s office is collaborating with 
the organization Uptrust to connect pretrial defendants with supportive ser-
vices.
262
 Community bail funds, the Good Call hotline, Silicon Valley De-Bug, 
and the recent mass bailout organized in New York City have also aspired to 
reduce risk through supportive interventions.
263
 New York’s “Supervised Re-
lease” program, piloted in 2013 and expanded citywide in 2016, secures the re-
lease of defendants who would otherwise remain detained pending trial.
264
 Li-
censed caseworkers and social workers assess participants’ needs and goals and 
then provide voluntary social-services referrals as well as court-date reminders 
by phone and text message. There is a light supervision component (check-ins 
that range from monthly to weekly, depending on the person), but the emphasis 
is on support, and early results have been promising.
265
 
 
260. Harlem Reentry Court, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, https://www.courtinnovation.org 
/programs/harlem-reentry-court [https://perma.cc/68CX-3NHM]. 
261. Jeff Mellow & Kevin Barnes-Ceeney, Key Factors to Promote Successful Comprehensive Reentry 
Initiatives, 81 FED. PROB. 22, 22 (2017) (“More and more, these collaborative efforts take the 
form of comprehensive or multi-faceted reentry initiatives that focus on strategic system-level 
change . . . .”). 
262. See Corey Jones, Twist on Innovative Smartphone App Aims to Help Poor Tulsa County Defendants 
Make Court Dates, TULSA WORLD (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts
/twist-on-innovative-smartphone-app-aims-to-help-poor-tulsa/article_a03efe4c-46bd-5a5c
-a641-d1d2bc5fe6d7.html [https://perma.cc/JUN4-8N2X]. 
263. See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nulliﬁcation, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 603-04 (2017) (describing how 
different bail funds support individuals they bail out); Jeffrey C. Mays, 105 New York City 
Inmates Freed in Bail Reform Experiment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/11/20/nyregion/bail-reform-rikers-rfk-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/Q8EL-X4J5] 
(noting that a mass bail-out effort included housing and transportation assistance for those 
released, as well as use of a cell phone and text-message court reminders); Ashley Southall, 
Bronx Hotline Helps People Make the Right Call After an Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/23/nyregion/bronx-hotline-helps-people-make-the 
-right-call-after-an-arrest.html [https://perma.cc/CW8G-XMDX]; Raj Jayadev, The Future 
of Pretrial Justice Is Not Money Bail or System Supervision—It’s Freedom and Community, SILICON 
VALLEY DE-BUG (Apr. 4, 2019), https://siliconvalleydebug.org/stories/the-future-of 
-pretrial-justice-is-not-money-bail-or-system-supervision-it-s-freedom-and-community 
[https://perma.cc/E8K9-WU5C] (explaining, among other things, Silicon Valley De-Bug’s 
Community Release Project). 
264. N.Y.C. Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice, A Guide to Pretrial Supervised Release (un-
published guidance) (on ﬁle with author). 
265. Between July and September of 2018, court-appearance rates for program participants in the 
ﬁve boroughs ranged from 85% to 92%, and at least 90% of participants in each borough 
bias in, bias out 
2293 
As these examples show, supportive strategies to reduce crime and arrest risk 
are feasible. And the requisite political will to develop them might actually exist. 
The national mood toward returning citizens, for instance, has undergone a def-
inite shift. For decades, legislatures bought political capital by codifying employ-
ment barriers and other civil disabilities for people with past convictions. They 
justiﬁed these laws as public-safety measures. By contrast, in the ﬁrst ﬁve 
months of 2018, “21 states . . . enacted laws to improve opportunities for people 
with a criminal record.”
266
 Even President Trump has signed on to the “second 
chance” agenda.
267
 In the criminal justice system itself, supportive reentry and 
“preentry” programs are gaining traction. And some risk-assessment-tool devel-
opers have begun to disclaim the idea that a risk score alone can justify increased 
restraint.
268
 This is not the same as targeting at-risk people for support, but it is 
a step in the right direction. 
As scholars of algorithmic fairness have observed in other contexts, whether 
algorithms exacerbate or mitigate social inequality is entirely a function of the 
uses to which they are put.
269
 If algorithms targeted the disadvantaged for sup-
port rather than for further disadvantage, their effects in the world would be very 
different. A supportive response to risk would not only serve to prevent new 
crimes and arrests; it would dramatically mitigate the harm of racial disparity in 
prediction and, over time, help to mitigate the structural inequalities that give 
rise to racially disparate risk patterns in the ﬁrst place. 
 
avoided felony rearrest. Supervised Release Quarterly Scorecard, N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFF. CRIM. 
JUST. 2 (Oct. 2018), https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/11
/SR_11.14.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GAD-ULV5]. 
266. CCRC Staff, More States Enact “Second Chance” Reforms, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RE-
SOURCES CTR. (June 11, 2018), https://ccresourcecenter.org/2018/06/11/three-more 
-states-enact-major-second-chance-reforms [https://perma.cc/7LG9-ZA55]. 
267. Donald J. Trump, President Donald J. Trump Proclaims April 2018 as Second Chance Month, 
WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions 
/president-donald-j-trump-proclaims-april-2018-second-chance-month [https://perma.cc
/2Q4F-VKRV]. 
268. The developers of the proposed Pennsylvania Risk Assessment Tool for sentencing, for in-
stance, intend for the tool to be used only to identify people for whom a court should order 
an in-depth presentencing report containing risk and needs information. Risk Assessment Pro-
ject Phase III: The Development and Validation of the Proposed Risk Assessment Scales, PA. COM-
MISSION ON SENT’G (May 2018), http://www.hominid.psu.edu/specialty_programs
/pacs/publications-and-research/risk-assessment/phase-iii-reports/development-and 
-validation-of-the-risk-assessment-scale/view [https://perma.cc/4AX6-PYTV]. 
269. See, e.g., O’NEIL, supra note 3. 
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D. The Case for Predictive Honesty 
To serve as a diagnostic tool for supportive interventions, risk assessment 
must measure existing risk patterns as faithfully as possible across racial lines. 
This requires that risk-assessment tools meet three metrics of predictive equality. 
First, individuals who pose the same statistical risk should receive the same 
risk score regardless of their race (a “single-threshold rule” for risk classiﬁca-
tion). As discussed above, this is a sine qua non of risk assessment itself. Second, 
to the extent possible with a single-threshold rule in place, a given risk score 
should communicate the same average risk regardless of the race of the person 
to whom it applies (“predictive parity” or “calibration”).
270
 
These two metrics may sound similar, but they are not coextensive. Assign-
ing the same risk score to all those who present the same risk will not necessarily 
produce predictive parity,
271
 and an algorithm might achieve predictive parity 
without assigning the same risk score to all who present the same risk.
272
 But a 
single-threshold rule and predictive parity are conceptually related in that both 
require that the relationship between a risk score and risk itself be constant across 
racial groups. A single-threshold rule requires that the algorithm consistently 
translate a given degree of individual risk into the same risk score regardless of 
race, and predictive parity requires that a given risk score consistently express 
the same average risk regardless of race. These two metrics are achievable in 
combination, furthermore, even if base rates of the predicted outcome differ 
across racial lines. 
Third, a predictive algorithm should order individuals along a spectrum of 
risk with equal accuracy for each racial group (i.e., have equivalent AUC scores 
by race). An algorithm’s AUC score relates to how well it differentiates between 
individuals who present differing degrees of risk. Although this measure says 
nothing about the meaning of an individual risk score, it is a valuable measure 
of an algorithm’s utility overall, and algorithms should have equal utility across 
racial lines. Equality in AUC scores is at least potentially compatible with a sin-
gle-threshold rule and predictive parity. 
None of these equity metrics, nor any combination of them, renders an al-
gorithm race neutral. On the contrary, achieving them may require race-con-
scious choices in the construction of the algorithm. And if the base rate of the 
predicted outcome differs across racial groups, the algorithm will still predict it 
 
270. In other words, the statistical meaning of the score itself must not vary by race. 
271. If the risk class is broad—encompasses anyone who poses between a 20% and 99% chance of 
rearrest, for instance—and the distribution of risk within the class is different across racial 
groups, then predictive parity will not necessarily result. 
272. Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 75, at 798. 
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more frequently for the high-base-rate group. If base rates differ, an algorithm 
that achieves these equality metrics will also produce unequal false-positive 
and/or false-negative rates. The call for “predictive honesty” thus privileges ra-
cial equality in the accuracy of a tool’s risk assessments themselves over statistical 
parity or parity in false-positive or -negative rates. 
If the risk-assessment tool is deployed for diagnostic or supportive purposes, 
though, racial inequality in the false-positive rate or total rate of positive predic-
tions should be less of a concern because a positive prediction does not mean an 
additional burden on the person deemed risky. On the contrary, if a positive pre-
diction means support, a higher rate of total positives or false positives is an as-
set. 
The proposal here should highlight the critical distinction between risk as-
sessment—the estimation of the likelihood of a future harm under status quo 
conditions—and action taken in response. Risk-assessment tools only purport to 
measure risk, and only under status quo conditions. They do not decide what 
action to take in response. Policy makers do. 
For algorithms tasked not with measurement but rather with allocating some 
beneﬁt or burden directly, the analysis of what equality measure to prioritize 
might look different. Equality in the accuracy of an allocation algorithm’s deter-
minations might be relatively less important. (It can be difficult to specify what 
“accuracy” means in an allocation context with multiple values at stake anyway.) 
Risk-assessment instruments should strive to assess risk as precisely as possible. 
Decision-making about how to respond to risk should strive both to maximize 
the net beneﬁt of policy interventions to society in general and to struggling 
communities in particular, and to minimize the net harm.
273
 
The distinction between risk assessment itself and the action taken in re-
sponse helps to explain the divergence between the present proposal and the one 
recently offered by Aziz Huq. Huq begins from the premise that criminal justice 
risk-assessment tools are “mechanisms to allocate coercion within the criminal 
justice system.”
274
 His analysis is addressed to equality in the allocation of coer-
cion rather than equality in the assessment of risk per se. If one takes account of 
this difference, Huq’s proposal and mine are not necessarily inconsistent. In an-
other new contribution, Deborah Hellman urges greater attention to the differ-
ence between algorithms that tell us what to believe and algorithms that tell us 
 
273. Cf. Corbett-Davies & Goel, supra note 68, at 8 (laying out a “utility-based framework” to rea-
son about equality in the context of allocation algorithms and identifying conditions under 
which a single-threshold classiﬁcation rule might not be optimal). 
274. Huq, supra note 14, at 1169. 
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what to do.
275
 Criminal justice risk-assessment tools purport only to tell us what 
to believe, and they can tell us what to believe about the risk of future events only 
under status quo conditions. It is up to us to decide what to do—and whether to 
do something that reinforces the status quo or rectiﬁes it. 
conclusion 
On June 6, 2018, the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing held a public 
hearing in Philadelphia on the newly proposed Pennsylvania Risk Assessment 
Tool for sentencing.
276
 The room was packed. One by one, community members 
walked to the lectern and delivered impassioned pleas against adoption of the 
tool.
277
 They argued that reliance on criminal-history factors would have dispar-
ate impact, and that the likelihood of arrest is an artifact of racially skewed law 
enforcement rather than a meaningful measure of risk. Several speakers won-
dered why the system is so ﬁxated on risk—the prospect of failure—in the ﬁrst 
place. Instead, they argued, it should direct its efforts to improving people’s pro-
spects for success. 
The speakers at that meeting offered a profound critique—of all state coer-
cion on the basis of risk. Some of their concerns were indeed speciﬁc to algorith-
mic methods and to the proposed Pennsylvania tool. But the deepest concerns 
of the community, the sources of its deepest outrage, applied equally to the sub-
jective risk assessment that already pervades the criminal justice system. 
Algorithmic methods have revealed the racial inequality that inheres in all 
forms of risk assessment, actuarial and subjective alike. Neither colorblindness, 
nor algorithmic affirmative action, nor outright rejection of actuarial methods 
will solve the underlying problem. As long as crime and arrest rates are unequal 
across racial lines, any method of assessing crime or arrest risk will produce racial 
disparity. The only way to redress the racial inequality inherent in prediction in 
a racially unequal world is to rethink the way in which contemporary criminal 
justice systems conceive of and respond to risk. 
The analysis of racial inequality in criminal justice risk assessment also serves 
as a case study for broader questions of algorithmic fairness. The important dis-
tinction between the two possible sources of intergroup disparity in prediction—
 
275. Deborah Hellman, Measures of Algorithmic Fairness, 106 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on 
ﬁle with author). 
276. See Proposed Risk Assessment Instrument, PA. COMMISSION ON SENT’G, http://www.hominid
.psu.edu/specialty_programs/pacs/guidelines/proposed-risk-assessment-instrument 
[https://perma.cc/U9S5-Q6EX]. 
277. See Palmer & Irizarry-Aponte, supra note 19. 
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distortions in the data versus differential base rates of the event of concern—
applies in any predictive context, as does the taxonomy of equality metrics. But 
the types of distortions that affect the data or algorithmic process will differ by 
context.
278
 So too will the analysis of what equality metric(s) it makes sense to 
prioritize. This is because the right equality metric depends on the relevant basis 
for the action at issue. When an algorithm’s very purpose is to accurately com-
municate statistical risk under status quo conditions, statistical risk is the only 
relevant basis for its action, such that two people who pose the same statistical 
risk must be treated alike. But in other contexts, algorithms might have other 
purposes. Algorithms used to allocate loans, housing, or educational oppor-
tunity might have distributional goals.
279
 Algorithms that drive internet search 
engines might be programmed to maximize the credibility of top results or min-
imize representational harms.
280
 Algorithms used to calculate lost-earnings 
damages in wrongful-death suits should perhaps have objectives other than re-
ﬂecting status quo earning patterns.
281
 Not all algorithms, in other words, 
should faithfully mirror the past. 
Given the frenzied uptake of criminal justice risk assessment and the furious 
resistance it has engendered, the present moment is crucial. The next few years 
will likely set the course of criminal justice risk assessment for decades to come. 
To demand race neutrality of tools that can only function by reﬂecting a racially 
unequal past is to demand the impossible. To reject algorithms in favor of sub-
jective prediction is to discard the clear mirror for a cloudy one. The only sus-
tainable path to predictive equity is a long-term effort to eliminate the social in-
equality that the predictive mirror reﬂects. That path should include a radical 
revision of how the criminal justice system understands and responds to crime 
risk. There is an opportunity now, with risk assessment and race in the public 
eye, to take it. 
  
 
278. It may be even more challenging in other arenas to ﬁnd a target variable that does not encode 
racial skewing vis-à-vis the actual outcome of concern. In the employment context, for in-
stance, employers want to predict success on the job. But the data on past success may be 
skewed by the company’s past discrimination in hiring or promotion practices. There is noth-
ing in the past data that reliably represents “job success” in a nondiscriminatory environment. 
279. See Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 75, at 805 (citing SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW 
THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2008)). 
280. See NOBLE, supra note 3, at 104. 
281. See Kimberly A. Yuracko & Ronen Avraham, Valuing Black Lives: A Constitutional Challenge to 
the Use of Race-Based Tables in Calculating Tort Damages, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 325, 330-33 (2018). 
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appendix:  the practical case against algorithmic 
affirmative action—an illustration 
This Appendix offers further explanation of how equalizing false-positive 
and false-negative rates might increase the net burden of prediction on commu-
nities of color. Consider the following example. 
In the juvenile-justice data recently examined by Richard Berk, there was a 
higher base rate of rearrest for violent crime among the black juveniles in the 
data set than among the white juveniles.
282
 For every 1,000 black juveniles, 140 
were rearrested and 860 were not. For every 1,000 white juveniles, 40 were re-
arrested and 960 were not.
283
 Say the false-positive rate (proportion of eventual 
non-rearrestees mistakenly forecast for rearrest) is 10% for each group. For every 
1,000 white juveniles, 96 (of the 960) non-rearrestees will be mistakenly fore-
cast for arrest. For every 1,000 black juveniles, 86 (of the 860) non-rearrestees 
will be mistakenly forecast for arrest. Equal false-positive rates mean fewer false 
positives per capita for black juveniles because there are fewer non-rearrestees to 
start with. 
But what if the false-negative rate (the proportion of eventual rearrests the 
algorithm misses) is 80% for each group? Then the algorithm will miss 112 (of 
the 140) rearrests per 1,000 black juveniles but only 32 (of the 40) rearrests per 
1,000 white juveniles. Equal false-negative rates mean many more false negatives 
per capita for the black juveniles because there are many more rearrests to begin 
with. The difference in the total number of false negatives swamps the difference 
in the total number of false positives across racial groups. Altogether, there will 
be 128 errors for every 1,000 white kids and 198 for every 1,000 black kids. The 
overall error rate for black juveniles will be signiﬁcantly higher. 
Now, the algorithm also produces greater per capita beneﬁts for black com-
munities because it successfully predicts a greater number of the black juvenile 
rearrests.
284
 Nonetheless, the greater total error rate overwhelms the greater per 
capita beneﬁt. The result is a higher net cost to black communities. The follow-
ing charts in Figure 5 illustrate this point. 
 
282. Berk, supra note 103, at 180. 
283. Id. 
284. This is on the assumption that violent-crime arrest corresponds to violent crime, and that 
violent crime is intraracial. 
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FIGURE 5. 
HIGH FALSE-NEGATIVE RATES CAN PRODUCE UNEQUAL “NET COSTS” 
 
 
 
The second reason that the increased net cost of a less accurate algorithm 
could fall disproportionately on black communities is that there might be more 
black people than white people in the system. The example above assumed that 
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there were equal numbers of black and white juveniles in the data set. But sup-
pose that twice as many black juveniles are arrested. In that case, the disparity in 
total errors and net costs will be doubled. In fact, even if the false-negative rates 
are low and the false-positive rates are high, such that the algorithm produces 
fewer per capita errors and a lower per capita net cost for black people, it might 
still produce dramatically more errors in absolute terms and have a greater net 
cost overall for black communities. The following chart shows the results if false-
negative rates are equalized at 10%, false-positive rates are equalized at 40%, and 
there are twice as many black juveniles in the system as white juveniles. 
FIGURE 6. 
EVEN WITH LOWER PER CAPITA “NET COSTS” FOR BLACK COMMUNITIES, DISPARATE 
POPULATION SIZES CAN PRODUCE UNEQUAL “NET COSTS” 
 
Lastly, if prioritizing equality in error rates imposes too great a cost in accu-
racy, it will eliminate the utility of prediction. Note that, in the second example 
above, the 40% false-positive rate means that almost half of those who will not 
be rearrested are misclassiﬁed, and the detention rate (if those forecast for arrest 
are detained) is nearly half of the entire assessed population. 
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